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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On September 27, 
2003, 24-year-old 
Surete Du Quebec 
Constable Patrick 
Levesque was killed in 
an aircraft accident 
while transporting a 
prisoner from Madelaine Island to Gaspe. The 
prisoner had been arrested for violating his 
parole and was being returned to Gaspe for a 
court appearance. The Piper Navaho plane 
crashed into a wooded area 
approximately two kilometers 
from the airport in Gaspe. The 
wreckage was found the 
following morning. The prisoner 
and the civilian pilot of the 
airplane were also killed. 
 
On September 26, 2003, 29-year-old Canadian 
Forces Military Police Corporal Stephen Gibson 
was killed when his unmarked patrol car was 
struck from behind on the Trans-Canada Highway 
near Medicine Hat, Alberta. Corporal Gibson was 
acting as an escort for the Terry Fox Run and was 
driving slowly behind the runners, in the right 
lane, when a tractor trailer struck his patrol car 
from behind at a high rate of speed. 
 
Corporal Gibson had been transferred to CFB 
Suffield only five days prior to 
the accident. He was killed on 
his first day of duty as a 
military police officer after 
graduating from the Military 
Police Academy in Borden, 
Ontario. 
 
 
This information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/canada 
 
‘LEGALLY BLIND’: 
KEEPING CURRENT IS CRITICAL 
 
Policing a democracy is no 
easy task. The rule of law is 
a bedrock principle and the 
police must respect the 
limits of the authority they 
are granted. There are many 
sophisticated nuances in 
applying and enforcing the 
law and ultimately decision making requires sound 
judgment, often in an atmosphere of violence with 
little time for reflection. There is no benefit of 
hindsight and often there is no opportunity for a 
second opinion, academic reflection, or peer 
review.  
 
One example of the complexity in the law 
enforcement role is the increasing body of case 
law that is continually developing. Following the 
developments is much like watching a growing 
plant, where a new branch will sprout and an old, 
dying one will fall. Beautiful to some, distasteful 
to others. And of course, some things never 
change. In its 1997-1998 Annual Report1, the 
Commission for Public Complaints Against the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police noted that policing 
is becoming more complex in terms of the legal 
regime that governs the rights of the accused 
and the admissibility of evidence. And further, 
the Commission stated: 
 
                                                 
1 Available online at www.cpc-cpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Reppub/index_ e.aspx? 
articleid=403 [November 27, 2003] 
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RCMP officers need to keep up to date on 
developments in criminal law, especially those 
that affect the use of police powers, 
acceptable methods of gathering evidence, and 
the rights of accused persons. In reviewing  
complaints, the Commission frequently 
concludes that the police officer in question 
was unaware of an important element of the 
law he or she was attempting to enforce. This 
shortcoming is not confined to junior officers 
of the Force; some supervisors have given 
unsound advice to police under their command 
because they failed to consider all relevant 
provisions of a law.  
 
This observation is not restricted to the RCMP. 
In his 2001 report, “Evaluation of the Training 
Provided by the Police Academy at the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia”, Dr. Radford noted: 
 
Worthy of special mention was that more than 
70% of the police officers interviewed made 
spontaneous reference to the need for regular 
and useful legal updates.  
 
The Courts, as well, have sometimes been critical 
of the police demonstrating a lack of legal 
knowledge. In some cases, judges have recognized 
that if the police did not know the law, they at 
least ought to have known it. Just as ignorance of 
the law is no excuse for the citizen2, it is also no 
excuse for the police3. And nor should it be. In R. 
v. Houle (1985) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (AltaCA), a 
police officer was attempting to enforce a law 
that he honestly and reasonably believed existed, 
but had been repealed a few days earlier without 
the officer’s knowledge. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal was required to decide whether the 
officer was nevertheless acting within the lawful 
execution of his duty for the purposes of 
resisting arrest, obstruction, and assaulting a 
police officer charges. In holding that the officer 
was not so engaged, the court held: 
 
In balancing the two competing interests that 
must be considered in determining the extent 
of the peace officer's duty, namely, the 
                                                 
2 See s.19 of the Criminal Code 
3 See R. v. Profeit, [1999] Y.J. No. 46 (YTTerCrt), R. v. Houle (1985), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 
57 (AltaCA) 
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protection of police authorities as against 
individual liberty, I would resolve the 
competition in favour of the citizen. I would 
not interpret police duties and powers as 
extending to the enforcement of non-existent 
law. I would not extend the duties to embrace 
actions taken in ignorance of the law -- an 
ignorance which does not excuse the citizen 
and should not protect the peace officer 
 
This issue of an officer’s legal knowledge and 
understanding has also been addressed many 
times when courts examine whether an officer 
was acting in good faith. For example, in the 
recent case of R. v. Lam, 2003 BCCA 593, a 28 
year police veteran testified that the law 
regarding consent searches was indecisive, or as 
he described it, like a “bowl of Jell-O…that 
seemed to change”. The court disagreed. In the 
majority’s view, “there was no reasonable basis 
for any uncertainty” because the Supreme Court 
had clearly laid down the rules for a valid consent 
in 1994. Similarly, the comments of Justice 
Stuart4 in 1999 are clear: 
 
Measuring the good faith of police depends 
significantly on their honest, reasonable basis 
for belief in understanding the law. An honest 
but mistaken belief that is not sustained by 
reasonable efforts to appreciate the law 
precludes any claim to good faith. Good faith 
requires taking reasonable efforts to 
understand and be current in their knowledge 
of the law. 
 
Evidence of good faith emanates from what 
police forces do to provide continuing 
education and from what the specific officer 
has done. Regular upgrading courses within the 
police department and supervision by lawyers 
or specialists within the force are essential 
measures in establishing good faith. The 
officer involved in the case must take full 
advantage of the services a police force 
provides to advance the basis of his/her 
knowledge of the law. 
 
Police are professionals, and one of the 
underpinnings of a profession is a specialized 
                                                 
4 R. v. Sawicki [1999] Y.J. No. 55 YTTerCrt 
field of knowledge5. Like it or not, the police 
make decisions every day that require careful and 
prudent deliberation that will impact people’s 
lives, in some cases forever. Errors can be costly.  
When the cops screw up, cases, careers, and even 
lives can be at stake. “There is an old saying, 
‘Doctors bury their mistakes while lawyers send 
theirs to prison’. Police officers do a little of 
both”6. As professionals, the police owe it to 
themselves, their families, their organizations, 
and their communities to pursue a path of 
continuous learning that keeps pace with today’s 
demands.  
 
This is one reason why the “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter was created. It is a quick way to stay 
on top of your game. Of course, it is not the end-
all-be-all. It is simply one method of bringing that 
golden legal nugget from the courts to you, 
officers who day in and day out hit the streets. 
Nearly all cases are cited with web addresses 
where the entire case decision can be accessed 
for your reading pleasure. Stay current and stay 
safe!!! 
 
POLICE LEADERSHIP  
2004 CONFERENCE 
APRIL 5-7, 2004 
 
Register soon, spaces are 
filling up! The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 
the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are hosting the 2004 
Police Leadership Conference in beautiful 
Vancouver, British Columbia.  This is Canada’s 
largest police leadership conference and the 
theme for this year is Excellence in Policing 
through Community health, Organizational 
performance, and Personal wellness.  
                                                 
5 Tinsley, P. (2002). Codes of Ethics and the Professions. Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police. Fall, 2002. 
6 Holden, R. (1986). Modern Police Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Simon & 
Scuster, Inc. at p.243. 
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The Conference will provide an opportunity for 
delegates to hear leadership topics discussed by 
lively and renowned keynote speakers.  
 
The Conference will be held April 5-7, 2004 at 
the beautiful and picturesque waterfront Westin 
Bayshore Resort & Marina. Register early as the 
2000 and 2002 conferences were sold out. Early 
registration is $325 before March 1, 2004. 
 
Keynote speakers: 
Chief William J. Bratton  
 
Appointed the 54th 
Chief of the Los Angeles 
Police Department, 
William J. Bratton 
oversees the operations 
of one of the largest 
major municipal law 
enforcement agencies in 
the United States.  His 
responsibilities include the supervision of 9,304 
sworn and 3,055 civilian employees with an annual 
budget of $927 million.  A strong advocate of 
transparent community policing that embraces 
partnership, problem solving and prevention, he 
initiated a major re-engineering of the Los 
Angeles Police Department, moving towards a 
decentralized police bureaucracy with stronger 
area commands that are more responsive to local 
community needs, and better trained and 
motivated police officers. Chief Bratton's vision 
includes a comprehensive and assertive strategy 
for dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and 
fear in the largest metropolitan city on the West 
Coast.  Particular emphasis has been placed on 
gang-related crimes and the culture that creates 
it. 
 
Chief Bratton is a former New York Police 
Commissioner who led that department to 39% 
decline in serious crimes and a 50% reduction in 
homicides.  He also initiated the internationally 
acclaimed COMPSTAT system - a computer driven 
management accountability process that is an 
integral part of his decentralized management 
philosophy.  It emphasizes a "management from 
the middle down" style that prioritized 
empowerment, inclusion, accountability, and the 
use of timely and accurate crime analysis to drive 
the organization. 
 
Chief Bratton is a graduate of the FBI National 
Executive Institute and was a Senior Executive 
Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy 
School of Government. He is a past  president of 
the Police Executive Research Forum, a frequent 
guest lecturer, writer and commentator, and is 
the co-author of his critically acclaimed Random 
House autobiography "Turnaround."  Among his 
many other honours and awards, Chief Bratton 
holds the Schroeder Brother's Medal, which is 
the Boston Police Department's highest award for 
valour. 
 
Mr. Gordon Graham 
Gordon Graham is a 30 
year veteran of California 
Law Enforcement. He 
holds a Master's Degree 
in Safety and Systems 
Management from the 
University of Southern 
California, a Juris 
Doctorate from Western 
State University, and was awarded his teaching 
credential from California State University. His 
education as a Risk Manager and experience as a 
practicing Attorney, coupled with his extensive 
background in law enforcement, have allowed him 
to rapidly become recognized internationally as a 
dynamic presenter with multiple areas of 
expertise. 
 
Over the last decade, Mr. Graham has spoken to 
over 300,000 law enforcement and other public 
safety professionals from every state in the US. 
Since 1990, he consistently received the highest 
evaluations on California P.O.S.T critiques. In 
1995, Mr. Graham received the Governor's Award 
for Excellence in Law Enforcement Training, the 
highest tribute available in the critical mission of 
training police professionals. His penetrating wit 
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coupled with his vast knowledge in multiple 
disciplines provides the enlightened listener, 
regardless of rank, with an information packed 
seminar that will benefit them in current and 
future assignments. 
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan  
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
joined the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary in 1970 
and was promoted 
through the ranks, 
attaining the post of 
Chief Constable in 
1996. In 1998 he 
received a Knighthood 
in the New Year Honours List. In 2002, Sir Ronnie 
retired from the police service and was appointed 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for 
London and the East Region and also the Ministry 
of Defence Police, UK Atomic Energy Authority 
Police, Guernsey, Jersey, the Sovereign Base in 
Cyprus and the Isle of Man. His portfolio 
responsibilities include Public Order, Terrorism, 
Ports and Special Branch, and Officer Safety. 
 
Sir Ronnie has travelled extensively in Europe and 
the United States to study policing methods. He 
has attended all the major courses, including the 
Senior Command Course at the Police Staff 
College at Bramshill. Holding a Bachelor of Arts 
degree and a Master of Arts degree in 
Administration and Legal Studies, he is also a 
graduate of the FBI Academy. In 2002 Sir Ronnie 
was awarded a Knight Grand Cross of the Order 
of the British Empire in the Queen's Birthday 
Honours List.   
 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin 
 
A veteran of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, Dr. 
Gilmartin is a principal 
in Gilmartin, Harris and 
Associates a Behavioral 
Sciences/ Management 
Consulting Company 
specializing in law enforcement/ public safety 
consultation. He holds a doctoral degree in clinical 
psychology from the University of Arizona and is 
the author of the book Emotional Survival for Law 
Enforcement: A Guide for Officers and Their 
Families. He holds adjunct faculty instructor 
positions with the University of Massachusetts 
Police Leadership Institute, and the Sam Houston 
State University Law Enforcement Management 
Institute of Texas. He is an instructor at the FBI 
Academy in Quantico, Virginia and a faculty 
member of the FBI Law Enforcement Executive 
Development Institute (LEEDS and EDI). He is 
also a guest instructor at the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 
He is retained by several Federal law 
enforcement agency critical incident response 
teams.  
 
Dr. Gilmartin formerly spent twenty years in law 
enforcement in Arizona. During his tenure, he 
supervised the agency Behavioral Sciences Unit 
and the Hostage Negotiations Team. He is a 
former recipient of an IACP-Parade Magazine 
National Police Officer Citation Award for 
contributions during hostage negotiations.  
 
RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli 
 
Commissioner Giuliano 
Zaccardelli joined the 
RCMP in 1970, and 
following recruit 
training was posted to 
Alberta where he 
performed a number of 
general policing duties. 
He was commissioned in 
1986 and was promoted to the rank of Deputy 
Commissioner, responsible for National 
Headquarters. In August 1999, Commissioner 
Zaccardelli assumed the newly created position of 
Deputy Commissioner, Organized Crime and 
Operational Policy.  
 
In 2000 Commissioner Zaccardelli officially 
became the 20th Commissioner of the Royal 
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Canadian Mounted Police. He holds a Bachelor of 
Commerce degree in Business Administration 
from Loyola College in Montreal and has 
completed the National Executive Institute 
Program at the FBI Academy in 1998. He is also a 
graduate of the Senior Command Course at 
Bramshill Police Staff College in England. 
 
Advanced Seminar/ Increment Course 
 
Like years past, Police Leadership 2004 will be 
offering an additional two seminar days in 
conjunction with the Conference for an extra 
$75. Participants will attend the JIBC on April 5, 
the Westin Bayshore April 6 and 7 for the 
conference, and return again to the JIBC on April 
8, providing a full 4-day course. Dr. Darryl 
Plecas (EdD) and Dr. Greg Anderson (PhD) will be 
instructing and facilitating the additional 2 days. 
Keeping in line with the conference theme, Day 1 
of the advanced seminar will provide a general 
introduction and background to issues involving 
personal and organizational wellness.  This 
experience will heighten the participant’s 
awareness of key concepts, and allow them to 
take in and assimilate the information presented 
during the conference with a higher level of 
understanding.  The day following the conference 
will provide participants an opportunity to review 
the material presented during the conference 
during focus groups.  This day will also end with a 
discussion of specific issues emerging within 
policing today, including information on the 
physical demands of police work, use of force, 
firearms training and multi-tasking. Interested 
police officers are advised to check with their 
departmental training officers to determine 
whether the course is eligible for increment 
status. 
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark:  
www.policeleadership.org 
or contact the Police Leadership 2004 
Conference Coordinator Sgt. Mike Novakowski at 
604-528-5733, toll free 1-877-275-4333 ext. 
5733, or e-mail at mnovakowski.jibc.bc.ca. 
CURRENT POLICE LEADERSHIP  
2004 CONFERENCE SPONSORS 
 
Platinum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bronze 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you, or your business, are interested in 
becoming a Police Leadership 2004 Conference 
sponsor, please contact the Police Leadership 
2004 Conference Coordinator Sgt. Mike 
Novakowski at 604-528-5733, toll free 1-877-
275-4333 ext. 5733, or e-mail at 
mnovakowski.jibc.bc.ca. 
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MISTAKEN LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION ERADICATES 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
R. v. Chamberlain, 2003 NBQB 347 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused after observing a 
vehicle stop briefly at a railway 
crossing with flashing warning 
lights and then cross the tracks while the lights 
continued flashing. An odour of alcohol was 
detected and the accused failed a roadside 
screening test. Breathalzyer readings were 
subsequently obtained and the accused was 
charged with driving while over 80mg%.  
 
At trial the Crown suggested that the police 
reasonably believed that the accused was 
committing an offence under s.182(1)(a) of New 
Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle Act, which reads: 
 
s.182(1)(a) Motor vehicle Act 
Any person driving a vehicle approaching a railroad 
grade crossing shall stop such vehicle within fifteen 
metres, but not less than five metres from the nearest 
rail of such railroad, when  
(a) a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device, 
designed to give warning of the approach of a railroad 
train, is exhibiting a warning signal, 
and shall not thereafter cross over the railroad track 
or tracks until the imminent danger from traffic on the 
railroad has ceased to exist. 
 
Although the Act requires drivers to stop at a 
railway crossing with a flashing signal, it does not 
obligate them to remain stopped until the lights 
stop flashing. Provided there is no longer 
imminent danger from railway traffic, the driver 
may proceed through the flashing lights.  
 
The trial judge concluded that the officer 
erroneously believed the accused had to remain 
stopped at the flashing warning lights in the 
absence of imminent danger. Thus s.182(1)(a) 
could not be relied upon as statutory authority to 
justify the stop. Since there was no other reason 
to stop the accused, the officer lacked an 
articulable cause and his right under s.9 of the 
Charter to be free from arbitrary detention was 
breached. The breathalyzer results were 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter and the 
charge was dismissed. 
 
The Crown appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Queen’s Bench arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in applying the law on articulable 
cause.  
 
Articulable Cause 
 
A police officer may lawfully detain a motorist at 
common law provided the police have an 
articulable cause (aka: reasonable suspicion) on 
which to justify the detention. The Crown 
submitted that the officer honestly, but 
erroneously, believed an infraction had occurred 
when he saw the accused cross a railroad track 
with warning lights flashing. This, it was 
contended, was sufficient to meet the articulable 
cause threshold. The accused, on the other hand, 
suggested that there was no objective basis for 
the officer’s subjective, but mistaken, suspicion. 
Justice Guerette, of the Court of Queen’s Bench, 
agreed with the accused: 
 
There is only one "fact" before this Court (and 
before the Court below) which the Crown 
alleges constitutes articulable cause: The fact 
that the police officer honestly believed the 
[accused] was committing an offence. That 
assumption was based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the law. The [accused] was 
not committing an offence and otherwise was 
not demonstrating any behavior which would 
lead a police officer to suspect that an 
offence was being committed. 
 
The police officer, though acting honestly, did 
not have any "objectively discernable facts" on 
which to base his conclusion about the 
[accused]. If it were otherwise, it would 
encourage willful ignorance of the law on the 
part of the police. The objective standard is a 
key component of articulable cause and is 
there precisely to review the conduct of police 
officers when they arrest and detain people 
they "honestly" believed were committing a 
crime.  
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The Crown had failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of an articulable cause and the 
detention was unlawful. The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org  
 
COUNSELLING REQUIRES 
INTENT THAT CRIME BE 
COMMITTED 
R. v. Hamilton, 2003 ABCA 255 
 
The accused sold a package of 
files to 20 people over the 
internet, including an undercover 
police officer. Five of the 200 
files in the package contained 
material related to constructing bombs, breaking 
and entering, visa hacking, and generating credit 
card numbers. The accused was charged with 
counselling four indictable offences not 
committed under s.464 of the Criminal Code. At 
his trial the accused testified that he did not 
read all of the files and did not encourage 
customers to commit crimes. No one receiving the 
files committed an offence as a result of 
receiving the information. 
 
The judge concluded that the accused did not 
possess the requisite mens rea and acquitted him 
on all counts. In her view, the accused must not 
only intend to counsel the criminal act but must 
also intend that the counseled crime be 
committed. The Crown appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal suggesting, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in interpreting the mens rea 
requirement. It was the Crown’s position that the 
only mens rea required was that the counselling 
be intentional and proof of an intention that the 
counselled crime be committed was not required. 
 
Counselling a Crime not Committed 
 
Section 464 of the Criminal Code creates an 
offence for a person to counsel another to 
commit a crime if the crime is not in fact 
committed. Because there is no legislative 
direction on the means rea, it is presumed that a 
subjective form of mens rea is necessary. While 
the actus reus of the crime of counselling is that 
“the accused must pass on material or make 
statements that, when viewed objectively, 
“actively” induces or encourages a criminal 
offence”, the most demanding standard of 
subjective mens rea, intention, is required. The 
lesser standards of recklessness or willful 
blindness will not suffice. Justice Conrad, for the 
unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal stated: 
 
In summary, intention is the appropriate level 
of mens rea for counselling under section 464 
because it is the strictest standard. This 
section was never intended to catch within its 
net a professor teaching a class how to make 
bombs or an RCMP instructor teaching 
students how criminals create credit cards. 
Rather, it is aimed at those who encourage 
others to actually commit crimes. [para. 33] 
 
Thus, the appeal court held that the counsellor 
must not only intend the acts of inducement, but 
also must intend that the counselled crime be 
committed. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
FINDING FUN IN 
FITNESS 
Cst. Kelly Keith 
 
 
Quality vs. Quantity 
 
When it comes to working out (weights, aerobics, 
etc.), we must always keep in mind that the 
quality of the workout and the benefits we 
receive derive from the effort we put in.  I am 
not a fan of many group exercises since the group 
is only pushed as hard as the weakest link, if you 
are mandated to stay together.  It does not stand 
to reason that we write exams or compete at the 
weakest person’s level, just as it does not stand 
to reason that we will make gains in physical 
fitness if we compete at the weakest link’s level.    
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If I regularly run a 6 minute mile and the group 
pace is a 10 minute mile I will never improve my 6 
minute mile pace and will not push my heart rate 
up to a level to make gains at a 10 minute mile 
pace.  If I bench 200 lbs for 10 reps, however as 
a group we bench 140 lbs for 10 reps, again I will 
not make any gains.   TO MAKE GAINS THE 
EXERCISE TIME YOU PUT IN MUST 
CHALLENGE YOU !   Group exercises are great if 
everyone in the group is able to push "THEIR" 
own physical abilities.  I am a fan of circuit 
training for this very reason.  You work as a 
group, however you are pushing your "OWN" 
physical abilities.  
 
What if I want to run with my partner or 
work-out with a person who lifts less 
weight? 
 
This can still be done very efficiently.  If you are 
running, swimming, etc. with a partner that is not 
at the same aerobic level, simply ensure you 
include some wind sprints.  For example, if you are 
on a 5 km run you can do you wind sprint ahead at 
every 1 km interval and then sprints back to re-
join your partner.   With a weight work-out, 
simply ensure you are working at the weight that 
pushes your strength to its limit and not to your 
partner’s.  You can still do the same exercises and 
both make gains! 
 
How do I rate if I had a quality work-
out? 
 
As Charles Staley so elegantly stated, “If we rate 
our performance based on feeling fatigued and 
terrible after the work-out we could simply apply 
for a sparring partner for Mike Tyson.”   
 
Can Quality be judged by what our goals 
are? 
 
If it is a pure strength workout you are after 
then our goals will be to lift a heavier weight.  In 
other words, 2 reps of 185 lbs is a higher quality 
workout than a set of 8 reps with 165 lbs - even 
though 165 lbs may feel more difficult! 
 
If flexibility is your goal, you need to have an 
accurate measure of where you're at and each 
session attempt to push at least 1 mm past this 
point. If endurance training is your goal, use a 
heart monitor.  The higher the heart rate the 
harder you’re working.  A heart monitor is 
extremely important if you are serious in 
improving your aerobic conditioning. 
 
Keeping a Journal of your fitness is an excellent 
way for you to be accountable for your gains! 
 
Charles Staley’s 5 tips on improving your 
skills training: 
 
1) Practice your skills while you’re fresh and 
concentration levels are high; 
 
2) Shorter, more frequent sessions are 
preferable to longer sessions; 
 
3) Make sure you have a method to assess both 
the quality and quantity of you training; 
 
4) Once a skill is stable, it can be maintained 
with a lower volume of training; and 
 
5) Fatigue is largely specific - if you are having a 
hard time practicing a skill that has a large 
balance element, switch and work on a skill 
that has a different quality, such as a 
technique that required a high degree of 
speed. 
 
Succinctly, in order to make Physical Gains we 
need to push ourselves to new limits. This 
requires QUALITY TRAINING rather than 
QUANTITY.  Shorter quality workouts vs. longer 
less frequent workouts will ensure you make the 
hard earned gains you are after! 
 
Don't be a Kelly 
 
I wish sometimes that " I would do as I say, 
rather than do what I do ".  I was training for 
an adventure race in Port Angeles and had trained 
quite hard for the race, putting in many hours.  I 
have always had tight hamstrings, and have many 
times been laid up due to pulling them.  Well my 
hamstrings were feeling fine while I was training 
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so I began to neglect my stretching routine.  I 
continued to train hard and one week before the 
race I pulled my hamstrings, and could not enter 
the race - If anyone should know better it's me!  
So my point—train your weak body parts first and 
do not neglect stretching!    
 
If I had kept up my stretching routine, this 
injury would most likely never have happened.  My 
hamstrings should be my first priority BEFORE I 
start any exercising.  Just because my hamstrings 
felt good on a certain day is absolutely no excuse 
for not stretching them, subsequently I paid the 
price. 
 
Nutrition tidbit 
 
Kashi makes a great cereal called Kashi Crunch.    
This cereal is great tasting right out of the box 
and the ingredients are very nutritious.  If you’re 
looking for a healthy, sweet tasting, and 
nutritious snack - put some in a plastic baggy, add 
a small amount of almonds, and enjoy.   As well 
Natures Path makes a cereal called Optimum 
Power Breakfast. It contains a great combination 
of protein, carbohydrates, and flax and also 
tastes great.  Give them a try!  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“All that is required for evil to prevail is for good 
men to do nothing.”-Edmund Burke 
 
JI GETS NEW LOGO 
 
As you may have noticed from viewing the front 
of this newsletter, the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia now has a new logo.  
SECURITY GUARD NOT ACTING 
AS POLICE AGENT 
R. v. Chang, 2003 ABCA 293 
 
Concerned about possible illicit 
activities in a mall parking lot 
near some after hours clubs, a 
uniformed private security guard 
approached a parked vehicle with 
its lights on. Two persons were in the vehicle and 
the accused, occupying the driver’s seat, quickly 
hid something in his hand. Concerned about her 
safety, the security guard asked what he was 
hiding.  He showed the guard an open pill bottle 
containing gel caps, but labeled ephedrine 
“tablets”. The guard was familiar with ephedrine, 
but had never seen them in this form.  The guard 
called police who arrived on scene within minutes. 
The officer seized the 44 pills for analysis and 
the accused was subsequently charged with 
possession of ecstasy for the purpose of 
trafficking under s.5(2) of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act.  
 
At trial, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
justice concluded that the Charter applied to the 
security guard’s actions. In his view, although the 
security guard was not acting under the direction 
of the police, she was familiar with police 
procedure and was acting as an agent of the state 
when she questioned the accused about the item 
in his hand. Furthermore, the guard failed to 
advise the accused of her suspicion, tell him why 
she was asking, or advise of him of his right to 
counsel. The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) 
of the Charter and the charge was dismissed. The 
Crown appealed the acquittal to the Alberta Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in finding that the guard was acting as an 
agent of the state.  
 
Police Agent? 
 
Unless a private citizen is acting as an agent of 
the state, performing a specific state function, 
or their actions are “part of government”, 
Charter scrutiny is not triggered. Despite her 
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familiarity with police procedures, in this case 
the security guard was not acting under police 
direction and police intervention did not occur 
until after the guard had obtained the drugs. The 
guard’s inquiries with the accused arose from her 
own safety concerns and her private parkade 
patrol duty at the mall, rather than the 
performance of a state function like initiating 
criminal charges. Comparing the role of the 
security guard to that of a school principal, the 
unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal held: 
 
In our view, the security guard’s responsibility 
for protecting mall property and well-being is 
analogous to that of a principal’s responsibility 
for enforcing school discipline. Given that 
responsibility and the finding of no prior police 
contact specific to this case, it was an error 
of mixed fact and law to conclude that the 
security guard was acting as an agent of the 
state when she inquired about the item in the 
respondent’s hands. Nor could it reasonably be 
inferred that her mere familiarity with police 
procedure disclosed a motivation to initiate 
criminal charges. Hence in our view, contrary 
findings of the trial judge in that regard do 
not warrant deference, and cannot be 
sustained. We are satisfied that the actions 
of the security guard in acquiring possession 
of the drugs are not subject to Charter 
scrutiny.  [para.18] 
 
However, the action of the security guard in 
handing over the pill bottle and its contents to 
the police constituted a seizure under s.8 of the 
Charter. In other words, although the Charter 
was not engaged when the guard received the 
pills, it was triggered when the guard gave the 
pills to the police since at the time of transfer 
the accused continued to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in them. The Court stated: 
 
…the [accused’s] voluntary surrender of the 
pills did not convey ownership to the security 
guard entitling the police to rely on the guard’s 
transferral to them. Hence, although the 
security guard was not an agent of the police, 
and her acquisition of the pills did not 
constitute a seizure, nonetheless in our view, 
the “transfer of control” of the bottle and 
contents did constitute a seizure by the police 
within the meaning of s.8 of the Charter. [para. 
41] 
 
Effect of Admission of Evidence? 
 
Having found a breach, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal examined whether the evidence should be 
excluded under s.24(2). In this case, the court 
concluded that the evidence should be admitted. 
The pills were real, non-conscriptive evidence 
existing prior to and independent of the Charter 
violation; its admission would not render the trial 
unfair. The breach was not serious and the police 
obtained the pills in good faith. The exclusion of 
the evidence, not its inclusion, would “diminish the 
reputation of the justice system”.   
 
Common Law Exclusion? 
 
In a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, R. 
v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, it was hinted that 
evidence could be excluded under a judge’s 
common law discretion to suppress even where a 
private citizen’s actions did not attract Charter 
protection. In this case however, the appeal court 
concluded that the “analysis of the common law 
exclusion would inevitably reach the same 
conclusion as the s.24(2) analysis” rendering the 
evidence admissible.  
 
The appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
CHARTER BREACH MUST BE 
MORE THAN TENUOS TO 
WARRANT EXCLUSION 
R. v. Pettit and Pranic, 2003 BCCA 522 
 
Police obtained a drug warrant 
under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act to search a 
home that was unoccupied when 
police arrived. A marihuana grow operation was 
found in the basement. A copy of the search 
warrant was placed on the kitchen table. Near the 
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end of the search both accused returned to the 
home and were promptly arrested at the door 
before they entered the house. The accused Petit 
demanded to see the warrant and to call a lawyer. 
He was handcuffed and placed in the rear of the 
police car. An officer retrieved the warrant from 
inside the house and held it against the Plexiglas 
safety shield in the police car and showed it to 
Petit.  
 
The police ignored Pranic’s request to see the 
warrant and neither accused was provided the 
opportunity to contact counsel until at the police 
office. The warrant was put in Petit’s effects and 
was placed on the counter for him to take upon 
his release. However, for reasons uncertain, he 
did not take it. It was subsequently delivered to 
him at his residence a couple hours later. Both 
accused were charged with producing marihuana. 
 
At their trial, the judge concluded that, although 
the search warrant had been properly issued on 
the basis of an anonymous tip, personal police 
observations at the address, and Hydro 
consumption records, the accused’s rights under 
s.8 and s.10(b) of the Charter were violated. In 
his view, the police did not properly “produce” the 
warrant as required by s.29(1) of the Criminal 
Code, which reads: 
 
s.29(1) Criminal Code 
It is the duty of every one who executes a process or 
warrant to have with him, where it is feasible to do so, 
and produce it when requested to do so. 
  
The trial judge found that the accused Petit had 
not been given “the opportunity to properly 
consider, inspect or use the document.”  He 
stated: 
 
A warrant to search is a complex document with 
large, small and extra tiny commercial print and 
spaces for typed or script inserts.  Only close 
examination could disclose whether it was 
authorized by a justice of the peace, whether 
the search was taking place at the authorized 
place, whether the search was commenced 
within the authorized time frame and whether 
the search was being conducted by authorized 
peace officers, among other things. 
 
The accused Pranic’s s.8 right was also violated 
because the police altogether ignored her request 
to see the warrant.  
 
The s.10 breach arose, according to the trial 
judge, because the accused were not provided 
access to counsel at the scene. The house had 
been secured, there were telephones inside the 
home, and the police also had access to cellular 
telephones. The two cooperative, non-violent 
arrestees could have been afforded a secure 
private telephone, either in the house or while 
locked in the police car. As a result, the trial 
judge excluded the evidence under s.24(2) of the 
Charter and the accused were acquitted. 
 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal. In its ruling, the appeal court justices 
unanimously granted the appeal and ordered a new 
trial. Without addressing whether the police 
breached the provisions of s.29(1) of the Criminal 
Code, the court examined the s.24(2) decision of 
the trial judge. For evidence to be excluded 
under s.24(2), the evidence must have been 
obtained in a manner that violated the rights of 
the applicant seeking exclusion. Generally, the 
evidence must flow from the breach (a causal 
link) or be temporally connected. In this case, 
there was no relationship between the police 
conduct resulting in the Charter breach and the 
evidence, and the temporal connection was 
tenuous at best. Unlike a Charter violation that 
occurs at the outset of police activity such that 
it could be characterized as intimately connected 
with a search, the search here was virtually 
complete before the s.29 Criminal Code default. 
Justice Donald stated: 
 
With respect, I do not see how the [accused] 
can fit themselves within the two aspects of 
the purpose for s. 29(1) [to allow the occupant 
of the searched premises to know: (1) why the 
search is being carried out, so as to enable the 
occupant to properly assess his or her legal 
position; and (2) that there is, at least, a colour 
of authority for the search and that forcible 
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resistance is improper].  When they returned 
home the search, which had been lawfully 
conducted, was over and they were placed under 
arrest.  I think it is unrealistic in those 
circumstances to speak of the respondents' 
assessing their legal position in relation to the 
search.  Forcible resistance was out of the 
question not only because it would have been 
after discovery of the grow operation but also 
the respondents were under police restraint.   
 
… I cannot find a sufficient connection 
between the failure to produce the warrant 
properly and the obtaining of the evidence.  
There is no real temporal link because the 
default came after the evidence was lawfully 
obtained.  Nor can there be any causal link 
because of the sequence of events… 
 
While it was necessary for the trial judge to 
consider the breaches of s. 8 and s. 10(b) 
together in deciding the exclusion issue under 
s. 24(2)…, my view is that the s. 10(b) breach 
added nothing to the linkage between the 
violations and the obtaining of the evidence.  
The delay in providing the opportunity to 
contact counsel occurred after the search and 
so seeking advice as to the legality of the 
search would have served no immediate 
purpose.  When the whole of the relationship 
between the breaches and the evidence is 
examined it falls well short of establishing 
that the evidence was obtained in a matter 
that infringed rights under the Charter. [para. 
19-21, references omitted, emphasis added] 
 
Justice Esson agreed with the disposition of the 
appeal by Justice Donald, but felt it necessary to 
express his reservations in obiter dicta about the 
correctness of the trial judge’s decision on the 
s.29(1) Criminal Code issue. In his view, the 
accused’s request to “see” the warrant was 
construed by the officer as a “request or demand 
to be shown the warrant”, and not necessarily a 
request “to be given an opportunity to read the 
warrant more closely to satisfy the obligation 
under s.29(1).” (emphasis added) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ACCUSED MUST PROVE 
EXISTENCE OF CURFEW NOTE 
R. v. Gus, 2003 BCPC 0349 
 
The accused, who was the 
subject of a probation order not 
to be out of his residence 
between 11 pm and 7 am unless 
he was in possession of written permission from 
his conditional sentence supervisor or probation 
officer and to produce it to a peace officer on 
demand, was checked by police walking on a city 
street at 2:55 am. One of his arguments at trial 
in British Columbia Provincial Court was that the 
Crown needed to prove that he did not have 
written permission to be outside his residence 
during his curfew. Justice Rodgers rejected this 
submission. In the judge’s view, if the accused 
sought to use the exception contained in the 
probation order the onus was on him to prove the 
exception existed. In other words, the accused 
was required to prove the existence of written 
permission to be outside his residence. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
POLICE MUST CHOOSE WORDS 
CAREFULLY 
R. v. Leclair, 2003 MBPC 10037 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police and after blowing a fail 
into a roadside screening device 
was read his s.10(b) Charter 
rights. The accused 
acknowledged understanding and replied, “Sure”, 
when asked if he would like to call duty counsel or 
another lawyer. The accused was then 
transported to the police station where he was 
placed in an interview room. A police officer 
pointed out the Legal Aid duty counsel telephone 
number on the wall and dialed the number. As 
well, the officer provided a telephone book and 
told the accused that when he was done speaking 
with a lawyer he was to bang on the door and the 
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breath test would then be taken. The officer left 
the room and closed the door for privacy. 
 
After approximately 20-25 minutes the accused 
banged on the door and the officer was told that 
the line was busy despite several attempts. The 
officer himself dialed the number and also 
received a busy signal. The accused was then told 
that he would have to provide a breath sample 
whether he spoke to a lawyer or not and that it 
was in his best interest to do so. He was also 
advised that if he refused, he would be charged 
with refusal which carries the maximum penalty. 
The accused made no further attempts to speak 
to a lawyer and he blew into the breathalyzer and 
failed. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the 
accused argued that his right to counsel was 
violated because his waiver was invalid. He 
submitted that his waiver was not based on an 
informed decision because the police told him it 
would be in his best interest to blow, that he had 
to do it regardless of whether he spoke to a 
lawyer, and that a refusal would carry the 
maximum penalty. The Crown contended that the 
accused was provided a reasonable opportunity to 
access counsel but was not reasonably diligent and 
subsequently waived his right. 
 
Justice Chartier agreed with the accused. A 
proper waiver of the right to counsel requires 
that an accused be properly informed of their 
right to counsel, that they are aware of their 
jeopardy, and that they appreciate the 
consequences of deciding for or against speaking 
with a lawyer. In this case, the waiver was invalid. 
Although the accused was properly informed of 
his right to counsel he was not aware of the 
jeopardy he was facing. The police told him that 
“either way he had to blow or he’d be charged 
with refusal, which carries the maximum penalty”. 
In the judge’s view, “a reasonable person would be 
left, as a result of this comment, with the 
impression that it would be in his/her best 
interest to provide the breath samples.” In 
finding a s.10(b) Charter breach, the judge 
stated: 
 
Let me indicate that I do not want, in any way, 
to leave the impression that I find that the 
Police were acting in some oppressive or 
underhanded fashion. This is a situation where 
the Police have to choose their words carefully. 
The fact of the matter is that there is no 
maximum penalty that exists for refusing to 
provide a breath sample and that in certain 
circumstances an Accused is entitled to refuse 
to provide a breath sample. [para. 27] 
 
Since the certificate of breath analysis was 
conscripted evidence, it was excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter because its admission 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DOMINANT PURPOSE NEVER 
CHANGED: PRESUMPTIVE CARE 
& CONTROL ESTABLISHED 
R. v. Schnell, 2003 SKCA 96 
 
The accused left a friend’s 
house after consuming 9 to 10 ½ 
ounces of wine and drove to the 
farm of her estranged 
boyfriend. After being told by 
the ex-boyfriend that he did not want to see her, 
she turned up the window of her car, started the 
motor to stay warm, and passed out. Her former 
boyfriend called police and the officer arrived to 
find the accused asleep in the driver’s seat with 
her head leaning against the driver’s window, her 
feet by the pedals, the engine running, the 
transmission in park, and the door locked. The 
emergency break was not engaged. The officer 
woke the accused and she subsequently provided 
breath samples over the legal limit.   
 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of care and control while 
over 80mg%. Relying on the presumption found in 
s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge 
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found that the accused never relinquished care 
and control of the vehicle; her intent was not to 
wait at the former boyfriend’s farm, but to move 
the vehicle as soon as she could. The “vehicle 
could have easily been put into gear, deliberately 
or inadvertently, by simply shifting the lever on 
the steering column…”, the judge said. 
 
The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen’s Bench and her conviction was 
overturned. In the appeal judge’s view the 
element of dangerousness required for care and 
control to warrant a conviction was not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal. 
 
In restoring the conviction, the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal concluded that the accused did 
not rebut he presumption found in s.258(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code. This section creates a 
presumption that where it is proved that a person 
occupied the driver’s seat of a vehicle they shall 
be deemed to have care and control, unless they 
establish that they did not occupy the seat for 
the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion. 
Justice Tallis, for the unanimous appeal court, 
stated: 
 
In this case the evidence demonstrated that 
[the accused’s] dominant or controlling purpose 
before the critical overlap period [2 hours 
before the first breath sample and the time 
the officer arrived on the scene] was to 
eventually set the vehicle in motion. She 
passed out either before or during the critical 
overlap period. She took no action that shows a 
change in her dominant or controlling purpose 
before she passed out….Since there was no 
action demonstrative of a change in the 
dominant purpose, the Crown was entitled to 
rely on the presumption to establish “care and 
control”.  
 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction was 
restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
TWO-YEAR JAIL TERM FOR 25 
YEAR OLD DOMESTIC ASSAULT 
NOT UNFIT 
R. v. W.J.T., 2003 NSCA 108 
 
The accused was convicted 
during a jury trial of assaulting 
his wife in 1978. He punched her 
during an argument, rupturing 
her spleen, which had to be surgically removed 
and left her with a permanent impairment. His 
relationship with his family was described by the 
sentencing judge as one “with a high degree of 
brutality”. In sentencing him to a two-year 
sentence, the judge did not consider the passage 
of time as a mitigating factor because the 
accused scared his wife into not coming forward 
sooner. She was under his domination and control 
and the fear still reigned over her even when she 
left the home. It was not until she was 
approached by police that she told what 
happened. Three aggravating sentencing factors 
were identified by the judge: 
 
• the force of the blow resulted in permanent 
injury; 
• the victim was his spouse—she was isolated 
and subjected to his unrestrained violence; 
and 
• after striking his wife his concern was not 
for her recovery, but was for himself and 
that she not reveal how she was injured. 
 
The accused appealed his sentence to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing that the sentence 
was erroneous (outside the normal range for 
crimes of this nature). In dismissing the appeal, 
the Court was not satisfied that the trial judge 
failed to appreciate or apply proper sentencing 
principles. He considered the circumstances of 
both the offence and the offender as well as the 
mitigating and aggravating factors. The sentence 
was not unreasonable, unfit, or manifestly 
excessive.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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COMMUNITY 
POLICING…STARTING INSIDE 
THE DEPARTMENT 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin, PhD 
John J. (Jack) Harris, MEd 
 
Police administrators 
continue to face increasing 
social, financial and 
organization pressures to 
re-evaluate the police role 
in the community and make 
a commitment to 
community policing. Law 
enforcement agencies that 
are seen as social forces interacting and in 
partnership with the community stand in stark 
contrast to law enforcement agencies that are 
seen as free standing, isolated enforcers of social 
order.  Community partnerships are better able 
to define problems and areas of need, than are 
law enforcement agencies working alone and 
reactively viewing the community through patrol 
car windows. 
 
Police administrators, who typically agree with 
the philosophy of community policing, continue to 
reassess organizational roles in terms of 
partnership and community based problem solving.  
The "partnership," however, is often easier to see 
and accept by people at the top of an 
organization, than by line-level personnel.  Law 
enforcement executives often find themselves 
making a commitment to community policing and a 
community partnerships with little buy-in or even 
active resistance from other department 
members. 
 
Resistance From Within 
 
Despite the fact that many officers believe in 
community policing, it can be a hard sell to line 
personnel.  Administrators often interpret this 
resistance as, "officers just fighting change".  
While this may be partially accurate, there is 
another aspect that is often overlooked.  When it 
comes to solving community problems, law 
enforcement executives are quick to admit their 
organization alone doesn't know what is best for 
the community.  With this in mind, line personnel 
are encouraged to establish a "partnership with 
the community" by becoming problem solvers, 
being less authoritarian and by using more 
creative, proactive, innovative and non-traditional 
methods.  At the same time however, traditional 
authoritarian-based, paramilitary management 
practices are unchanged and remain a deep 
tradition within many law enforcement 
organizations.  So deep in fact, many supervisors 
and managers don't even realize they are still 
using them.  With this glaring inconsistency, 
officers often ask, "If this stuff is so good for 
and more effective with the community, why isn't 
it good for us?" 
 
Starting Inside The Department 
 
For community policing to become a reality, 
organizations must adopt a philosophy and 
implement management practices that are 
consistent for the entire community - both inside 
and outside of the department.  "Problem solving 
starts at home" is not just a cliché; it 
underscores the importance of community, 
partnership and collaborative problem solving 
inside the department. 
 
If community policing is to become more than a 
passing buzzword, police executives must accept 
the fact that "problem solving starts at home."  
Police administrators must initiate changes in how 
they conduct business internally, at the same 
time they are asking their officers to change the 
way they conduct business on the street.  Within 
any law enforcement agency, there are ample 
opportunities to apply community policing, 
partnership and problem solving techniques to 
internal issues. 
 
It is not unusual to see line personnel develop a 
cynical view of community policing and adopt a 
"let's wait and see how long this will last, this 
time around" attitude.  For the law enforcement 
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profession to change from reactive responders to 
proactive problem solvers, administrators must 
model the desired behaviours and ensure that 
needed skills are taught and developed. 
 
Managing law enforcement organizations from a 
strictly autocratic chain-of-command perspective 
will yield exactly what that management style is 
designed to produce - a unified, organized and 
reactive force that responds to the direction of 
the rank structure; reacting and obeying orders 
as defined by a higher authority.  While, to some, 
this might sound appealing, this management 
approach can produce intense feelings of 
resistance, victimization and passive sabotage to 
organizational change.  It also produces rigidity, 
stifles creativity, forces decision making upwards, 
and discourages self-initiated problem solving - all 
the things that community policing hopes to 
change. 
 
The Need For Balance 
 
The nature of police work requires law 
enforcement professionals to respond to many 
tactical situations with military-like 
accountability and direction.  Situationally, this 
approach is necessary for the effective delivery 
of police services.  However, when this is the 
prevalent or the only management style, line 
personnel see themselves at the lower end of the 
continuum of authority - a continuum that denotes 
the degree of importance within the agency.  An 
expectation of passive and competent obedience, 
while a trait valued in military operations, can be 
disastrous when trying to solicit input and 
involvement from line personnel in collaborative 
problem solving efforts.  If department members 
are to see themselves as partners in the joint 
venture of community problem solving, they must 
also see themselves as stakeholders - social 
equals in defining and solving internal department 
problems - in their own department. 
 
"Situational Leadership" (Blanchard & Hersey) 
emphasizes the importance of management 
flexibility and the use of management styles that 
are consistent with the situational demands being 
addressed.  Police administrators must create an 
atmosphere where situational leadership becomes 
the norm and where "Situational Followership" is 
cultivated - that is where employees can 
understand and distinguish between situations 
where strict compliance is required and where 
team building, collaborative problem solving skills 
are appropriate.  
 
Decisions based solely on an authoritarian 
management system might yield structured 
compliance but not creative contributions and 
solutions, a trait necessary for community policing 
to be successful.  The belief that, "the brass 
wants us to listen to the community and see what 
their problems are, yet they won't listen to what 
our problems at the department are," is not just 
grumbling from a few isolated malcontents, it is 
the reality for many officers.  For police 
administrators, the task of making department 
members stakeholders is predicated on the belief 
that all members of the department have a 
contribution to make to department problem 
solving and service delivery, beyond just 
respectful compliance to orders and directives.  
 
The Need For Change 
 
Can police administrators initiate significant 
changes in law enforcement/community 
interaction without precipitating major 
malcontentism or invalidating a very necessary 
chain-of-command protocol?  The answer is yes . . 
. if police administrators are willing to re-evaluate 
and redefine their management practices and 
executive roles as they relate to the department 
decision making and input processes. 
 
For officers to believe they are stakeholders in 
their department and for community policing to 
become a reality, police managers will more likely 
have to make greater changes than will line 
personnel.  In an authority-driven organization, 
problem definition and proposed solutions are 
usually judged by whom make the 
recommendations, rather than the accuracy of 
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the definition or the effectiveness of the 
solutions.  
 
Situations where there are high demands and low 
control cause major emotional distress for those 
involved.  Law enforcement personnel who have a 
heavy emotional investment in the job and little 
or no control over factors affecting that job will 
become the most distressed.  They often express 
their distress with passive resistance and 
sabotage, knowing that open dissention can bring 
sanctions for insubordination. 
 
To create an atmosphere of cooperation and 
reduce the sense of victimization, people either 
have to reduce their level of emotional 
investment in the organization or believe they 
have a meaningful degree of control or input into 
their job roles.  Talk about empowering 
department members, partnerships and 
collaborative problem solving usually occurs in the 
context of working with the community outside 
the department.  However, these concepts are 
often mere "buzzwords" or are simply ignored 
when they are applied to the community inside 
the department.   Line personnel are quick to see 
the discrepancy and realize that, despite what is 
being said, they have very little power in terms of 
their role in department problem solving. 
 
Collaborative problem solving and teamwork does 
not require police managers to relinquish their 
power or status.  Unfortunately, internal 
collaborative problem solving, partnership and 
empowerment are often seen as a threat to 
management's authority, status and position. 
 
Police managers have real power and authority 
within the organization.  Creating internal 
partnerships requires managers to accept the 
fact that, collaborative, department stakeholders 
can better define and solve internal problems.  
Managers must learn to situationally give up some 
of their authority-based decision making.  
Participative decision making has to and can 
effectively co-exist in a police agency with chain-
of -command decision making.  
 
Being a stakeholder means having a real say and 
an investment in the process.  For community 
policing to become a reality, law enforcement 
executives must create an internal atmosphere of 
"problem solving begins at home."  Better 
interpersonal, problem solving and group dynamic 
skills (including, team building, conflict and anger 
management, mediation techniques and 
communication skills) must become a requirement 
for all law enforcement personnel, regardless of 
rank.  Until police administrators are willing to 
create an atmosphere of internal partnership, 
community policing will remain just a trendy 
buzzword. 
 
While tactical decisions require tactical 
compliance, organizational input on less exigent 
matters must be solicited and valued.  
Partnerships based only on rank and status will 
yield at best compliance, not genuine buy-in or 
creative investment.  Group processes that value 
input and permit open, candid discussion can exist 
side-by-side with the traditional paramilitary 
command structure without compromising 
organizational functioning or discipline.  This 
does, however, require higher-ranking personnel 
to redefine the manner in which they manage and 
interact with their employees.  Rigid, rank- or 
status-driven decisions produce reactivity.  Open, 
respectful group processes can enhance the 
quality of police service and increase the sense of 
ownership by line personnel in the mission. 
 
Making It Work 
 
Commanders, who are comfortable with and 
benefit most (in the short-term) from rank-
driven, reactive compliance, may see this change 
as a threat to their authority.  In the long-term, 
however, these changes and a real sense of 
internal partnership will result in an overall 
improvement in department effectiveness and will 
make an administrator's tasks easier to complete. 
A workforce committed to the organization's 
long-term goals is far superior to a workforce of 
enthusiastic obedience by newer members, 
passive compliance by mid-career personnel and 
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open cynical negativity by veterans who gave up 
years ago on the idea of being stakeholders or 
that their input would be valued. 
 
Teaching police managers to interact with non-
managers in group discussions on a equal level and 
without personalizing criticism can be a difficult 
task.  Creating cross-functional teams that run 
parallel to the command structure is an important 
challenge for police executives who really want 
community policing to be an integral part of the 
department.  A commitment to "problem solving 
starts at home" has to become a reality before 
community policing can become a meaningful part 
of a department's culture.  
 
Law enforcement executives who make 
"Community Policing…Starting Inside the 
Department" a management reality can expect to 
see positive internal and external changes.  On 
the other hand, law enforcement executives who 
continue with business as usual inside the 
department while espousing the value of 
community policing outside the department, can 
look forward to continued internal resistance and 
misunderstanding and will not realize the full 
benefits of community policing. 
 
Editor’s note: “In Service: 10-8” would like to 
thank Dr. Kevin Gilmartin of Gilmartin, Harris, and 
Associates for permission in reprinting this 
article. This and many other excellent articles are 
available at the website of 
www.gilmartinharris.com. Dr. Gilmartin will be a 
keynote speaker at the Police leadership 2004 
Conference. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
It is one thing to have the time in a trial over 
several days to reconstruct and examine the events 
which took place….  It is another to be a policeman in 
the middle of an emergency charged with a duty to 
take action and with precious little time to minutely 
dissect the significance of the events, or to reflect 
calmly upon the decisions to be taken—Ontario 
Superior Court Justice Power7 
                                                 
7 Chartier v. Greaves, [2001] O.J. No. 634 (OntSCJ) 
COUNSELLOR MUST INTEND 
OFFENCE BE ACTUALLY 
COMMITTED 
R. v. Janeteas,  
(2003) Docket: C33474 (OntCA) 
 
The accused met a woman, who 
was having serious marital 
difficulties, and her mother 
during a business transaction and 
soon learned that the women 
wanted the husband harmed or even killed. To 
obtain some hard evidence to take to the 
husband, who was a doctor, the accused actively 
encouraged the woman and her mother on the 
telephone to have the woman’s husband harmed or 
killed and that he was willing to make the 
necessary arrangements as they wished. The 
accused tape recorded these conversations and 
met with the doctor to warn him. The doctor paid 
the accused $35,000 in cash. The accused was 
subsequently arrested and charged with 
counselling murder not committed and two counts 
of counselling unlawfully causing bodily harm not 
committed. 
 
At his trial, the accused testified that he never 
intended that any harm come to the doctor, 
rather he simply wanted to record the women’s 
plans so he could obtain some hard evidence to 
take to the husband.  The woman denied telling 
the accused that she wanted her husband killed 
and reported the accused’s activities to police. 
The accused was convicted by a judge and jury 
and received an 18-month conditional sentence. 
He appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing that the trial judge improperly instructed 
the jury on the necessary mens rea by telling 
them that the only intent required was that the 
accused spoke the words with the intent that his 
advice or counselling be accepted.  
 
The question on appeal was whether the mental 
state of the counsellor was irrelevant as to 
whether the offence was (or was not) to be 
committed. Crown argued that the only necessary 
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mental element is that the accused intended to 
speak the words constituting the counselling while 
the accused argued that in addition, the Crown 
must prove the accused intended the counselled 
crime to occur.  
 
Comparing the inchoate crime of counselling to 
that of attempts (which requires an intent to 
commit the desired offence) and conspiracy 
(which requires an intent to commit the offence 
that forms the subject matter of the 
agreement), the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled 
that the requisite mental element of counselling 
requires that the counsellor actually intend the 
offence be committed. This level of intent was 
not properly conveyed to the jury nor was there 
evidence to support it. Therefore the conviction 
was quashed and acquittals were entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
NO KNOCK ENTRY VIOLATES 
CHARTER: EVIDENCE EXCLUDED 
R. v. Lau, 2003 BCCA 337 
 
A police officer received an 
anonymous Crime Stoppers tip of 
a possible residential marihuana 
grow operation involving two 
Asian males in their 30’s. The tip reported that 
an odour of marihuana could be smelled coming 
from the home from time to time, the venetian 
blinds were closed, and there were two vehicles 
associated to the house. Following a number of 
visits to the house, the officer noted all but one 
small window was covered by venetian or vertical 
blinds. This small window had the blinds raised 
about 18” and had condensation on the bottom 
half. The officer also smelled growing, bulk 
marihuana on one or two occasions. A search 
warrant under s.11 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act was obtained. 
 
Prior to executing the warrant, a briefing was 
held to discuss the entry. Despite not knowing 
whether there were or were not weapons present, 
it was decided a battering ram would be used to 
surprise the occupants and gain quick control in an 
effort to ensure the safety of all involved, both 
the police and the occupants. The police entered 
the home by battering ram without knocking and 
announcing their presence and had their guns 
drawn. The accused was found seated in the living 
room watching television. A two-stage marihuana 
production operation consisting of 252 plants was 
located.  
 
At his trial, the British Columbia Supreme Court 
justice found the police violated the accused’s 
rights under s.8 of the Charter. Following 
precedent, in the judge’s view, the use of the 
battering ram was unreasonable in the 
circumstances.  However, he admitted the 
evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter. The 
accused appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred in 
failing to exclude the evidence. 
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed. 
Section 14 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act “permits the police to enter a 
home with a certain degree of force, without 
announcing their presence, if the circumstances 
make it necessary for them to do so.”  A knock 
and announce waiver requires a significant 
likelihood of danger to the police or loss of 
evidence if they do announce their presence. 
General experience of danger is not enough by 
itself to justify a no knock entry. In this case, 
there was no evidence that the police made any 
enquiries to determine the level of danger at the 
premises they searched. Instead, the police were 
acting under a blanket policy that was contrary to 
legislation. Justice Ryan, for the unanimous appeal 
court, wrote: 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the 
motivation behind the police policy in this case 
is not open to debate.  That it is necessary to 
ensure the safety of the police and of the 
occupants of a home when the police 
undertake operations to enforce the laws of 
this country is beyond question.  But good 
motives do not permit the police to formulate 
policies which are contrary to legislative 
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requirements.  The difficulty in this case is 
that s. 12 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act does not permit the 
formulation of a blanket policy for searches 
under s. 11 of the Act.  By s. 12 Parliament has 
required that the use of force be as is 
necessary in the circumstances.  Therefore, 
each case must be considered independently.  
The officers in this case did not advert to this 
requirement.  Rather, they based their 
decision to enter the premises in the manner 
that they did on a policy which, contrary to 
the Act, requires surprise entries with respect 
to every marijuana grow operation (unless the 
police know children or old people are present) 
without regard to the circumstances which 
prevail in the situation at hand.  Good faith 
cannot be founded on a policy which is made 
contrary to the dictates of the legislation. 
[para. 39] 
 
The method of entry was obtrusive and the 
accused’s privacy interest in his dwelling was high. 
The breach was serious, flagrant, and not 
committed in good faith. The evidence was 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter and the 
conviction was set aside and an acquittal was 
entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
POLICY BASED NO KNOCK 
ENTRY BREACHES COMMON 
LAW RULE 
R. v. Schedel & Schedel, 2003 BCCA 364 
 
A police officer detected a 
marihuana grow operation at a 
home. He could smell growing 
marihuana, heard fans running, 
and saw coverings on the basement windows. The 
officer informed a BC Hydro technician who 
conducted an investigation. He subsequently told 
the officer that a theft of electricity was 
occurring at the residence. The officer applied 
for and was granted a Criminal Code search 
warrant, which included an order allowing the 
technician to assist in the dismantling of the 
electrical diversion. There was no reference to 
drug offences nor did the police have any 
information about who might be in the house, who 
it belonged to, or who occupied it.  
 
A team of eight officers was assembled and the 
warrant was executed when police entered the 
home using a battering ram on the closed front 
door; the back door was open. No prior police 
warning was given and the officers entered with 
their guns drawn. After entry, police announced 
themselves and that they had a search warrant. 
The accused and two visitors were arrested for 
possession and production of a controlled 
substance, handcuffed, and ordered to lie on the 
floor. A marihuana grow operation and a quantity 
of harvested marihuana was found in the 
basement. All four persons were transported to 
the police station, strip searched, booked into 
cells, and later released. The visitors were never 
charged but the two accused were charged with 
production of marihuana, possession of marihuana, 
and fraudulent consumption of electricity.  
 
At their trial, the judge concluded that there 
were several Charter breaches including a s.8 
Charter violation protecting residents of 
dwellings from unreasonable search and seizure. 
This was the most serious violation and occurred 
when police failed to knock and announce at the 
time of their entry. The police had a policy and 
practice of entering without notice or 
announcement; arguing it was the safest method 
of entry for both the police and the occupants 
and because weapons had been occasionally found 
at marihuana production operations in the past.  
 
The police testified that unannounced entry 
creates the necessary surprise to ensure safety 
and does not allow the occupants any choice but 
to comply with the level of force presented.  
Unless there was evidence of the presence of 
children or elderly people, the approach taken by 
the police was to breach the door.  In the trial 
judge’s view there was no information specific to 
the premises that warranted the discarding of 
the knock and notice rule. However, he found that 
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the breaches were not sufficiently serious to 
warrant exclusion of the evidence. The police at 
the time were operating under an established 
policy that had not yet been ruled illegal. In any 
event, the grow operation would have been 
discovered whether they announced themselves 
or not. Thus, the accused were convicted.  
 
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, the evidence was excluded. In this case, 
“the police had no knowledge of who occupied the 
house and no information of any specific risk.” 
Generally, when a house is to be searched, the 
police must first make a formal demand to open 
the door before an entitlement to enter or use 
force arises. This demand can be discarded, 
however, if rapid action is necessary to prevent 
the loss or destruction of evidence, or if 
circumstances demonstrate a real threat of 
violent behaviour. It is not within the unfettered 
discretion of the police to deviate from the knock 
and announce rule. Where the police depart from 
the requirement to comply with this common law 
rule, they must establish why they used the force 
they did or enter without first announcing before 
they entered. It will not be sufficient to justify 
their manner of entry by what they find after 
they enter by using an ex post facto analysis. The 
police must have a real concern and identify 
specific circumstances upon which to base that 
concern before they enter without first knocking 
and announcing. 
 
The policy relied upon in this case to use 
unjustified force was an abuse of the common law 
and Charter rights of the accused and seemed “to 
run contrary to common sense as well as the clear 
letter of the law.” The court ruled that  “the 
means by which the search was carried out were 
so clearly unreasonable, and the Charter breach 
so serious, that the evidence must be excluded.”  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Be wise in the way you act toward outsiders; make 
the most of every opportunity—Colossians 4:5 
CANADIAN ‘AMERICA DAY’ 
RECEIVES FIRST READING 
 
On September 16, 2003 Bill S-
22, an Act respecting America 
Day received first reading in 
Canada’s Senate. The Act, if 
passed, will recognize 
September 11th of each year 
under the name of “America 
Day”. The preamble to this proposed Act reads: 
 
WHEREAS the surprise attack on innocent lives from 
all corners of the globe and representing all religions, 
in New York City on September 11, 2001, changed the 
history of the United States, Canada and the world; 
 
AND WHEREAS Canadians lives were among those lost: 
 
AND WHEREAS it is essential to ensure that history 
does not repeat itself; 
 
AND WHEREAS it is fitting to commemorate 
September 11 as a day of remembrance and reflection, 
on which to consider our common values and 
differences… 
 
 
ENTRY INTO TRAILER 
CONSENTUAL: POLICE 
OBSERVATIONS LAWFUL 
R. v. Pedden, 2003 BCCA 498 
 
A victim, known to have a 
problem with alcohol abuse, 
reported to a city police officer 
that she had been sexually 
assaulted in the accused’s trailer. She was 
referred to the RCMP, who had jurisdiction in the 
area, and a full statement was obtained where it 
became apparent that the victim did not know 
exactly what had happened. She said that after 
meeting a man named “Brian” at a pub the 
previous day, he picked her up and took her to his 
trailer. They ate ribs and drank alcohol. She 
remembered being straddled, having the accused 
attempt to pour alcohol down her throat, and 
having clear tape placed over her mouth. There is 
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a long gap in her memory and then she recalls 
waking up at home only wearing her outer clothing. 
She did not think she had been sexually assaulted 
because she had no injuries nor did she feel any 
pain. She would not go to the hospital for an 
examination but felt that something had 
happened to her because of the strange gap in 
her memory. 
 
A uniformed officer attended the accused’s 
trailer to see if a “Brian” lived there and to get 
his side of the story. The officer was not there 
to conduct a search and testified that he did not 
know if there was an assault or whether someone 
was partying, passed out, and then forgot where 
they were. The officer knew the accused’s full 
name because he queried the licence plate of the 
vehicle parked at the trailer. The accused was 
home when police arrived. 
 
Outside the trailer, the accused told the officer 
that he remembered the victim. He acknowledged 
meeting her at the pub and drinking together. 
The officer told the accused that she had come 
to the police with a story and that he wanted to 
ask a few questions. The accused said sure and 
agreed to allow the officer to step inside the 
trailer to discuss the matter. The officer asked 
to talk inside because he did not want to let 
others in the trailer park overhear the 
conversation.  
 
Standing just inside the door, the officer was 
able to see inside the trailer. The accused 
admitted the complainant had been at the trailer, 
and said she had became drunk and upset, 
urinated in her pants, and then vomited. He says 
he drove her home and did not see her again.  The 
officer informed the accused that the 
complainant had lost some personal items. The 
accused said she left nothing at the trailer and 
invited the officer to look around. The officer 
declined, however he could see some rib bones in 
an ashtray on the kitchen table and a video 
camera mounted on a tripod in the living room. 
The officer then left. 
 
Unsure of whether he in fact had a crime, the 
officer intended to re-interview the complainant. 
While at the detachment, the officer learned 
that another officer had an open sexual assault 
investigation file in the accused’s name resulting 
from an anonymous tip to Crime Stoppers. The tip 
reported that the accused was picking up women, 
drugging them, and videotaping sexual assaults 
against them. Based on this information, the 
police applied for and obtained a search warrant 
to search the accused’s trailer. The warrant was 
executed and videotapes and other physical 
evidence were located. Two other victims were 
identified and the accused was convicted in 
British Columbia Provincial Court of sexual assault 
causing bodily harm, sexual assault x 2, unlawful 
confinement x 3, administering a stupefying or 
overpowering drug to commit an indictable 
offence x 3, assault with a weapon, and uttering 
threats.  
 
The accused appealed his convictions to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that the 
police violated his Charter rights and that the 
evidence, including the videotapes depicting the 
sexual assaults, was inadmissible. He suggested, 
among other arguments, that the officer should 
have advised him of his Charter rights under 
s.10(b) when he attended the trailer to speak to 
him and that the warrantless entry at this time 
breached the accused’s right under s.8 of the 
Charter to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure.  
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected 
these grounds of appeal. Section 10(b) only arises 
on arrest or detention. Since the officer neither 
arrested or detained the accused when he 
attended the trailer to question him there was no 
need to provide s.10(b) rights. Moreover, the 
officer was not there to conduct a search. He was 
there to talk to the accused and determine what 
had happened. He did not trick his way inside, 
rather he was demonstrating concern for the 
accused’s privacy in suggesting they talk inside 
the trailer. The officer had no reason to believe 
there might be any evidence inside the trailer. 
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The presence of the rib bones only had the 
potential of circumstantially confirming the 
complainant had been there, a fact admitted by 
the accused. The accused had consented to the 
officer’s entry and had also invited him to look 
around. Thus, there was no illegal or unreasonable 
search. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ROADSIDE ‘FAIL’ READING 
CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING 
ACCUSED’s CREDIBILITY 
R. v. Fox, 2003 SKCA 79 
 
After stopping the accused at 
about 3:30 am for driving a 
truck without licence plates, the 
officer noted an odour of liquor 
on his breath. No other indicia of alcohol 
consumption were observed. The accused failed a 
roadside screening device, was arrested, and a 
demand for breath samples was made. Two breath 
tests were taken resulting in readings of 130mg%.  
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused testified he consumed a maximum of six 
cans of beer between 10:30 pm and 1:30 am. An 
expert in human absorption and elimination of 
alcohol provided an opinion that the accused’s 
blood alcohol level at the time of driving, based on 
his weight, alcohol elimination and absorption 
rates, and drinking pattern, would only be 60mg%. 
Furthermore, the expert testified that at the 
time of the first test his reading should have 
been about 53mg%. Although the trial judge 
accepted this evidence as rebutting the 
presumption of the breathalyzer’s accuracy, he 
ultimately rejected it and concluded that on the 
whole of the evidence, including the fail on the 
roadside screening device, that the accused was 
guilty.  
 
The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen’s Bench which ordered a new trial. The 
appeal judge agreed that uncorroborated 
evidence of low alcohol consumption by itself can 
rebut the presumption of accuracy, but the trial 
judge’s reliance on the roadside screening device 
warranted a new trial. The Crown appealed this 
judgment to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.  
 
Section 258 of the Criminal Code creates two 
presumptions:  
 
• the presumption of identity; and  
• the presumption of accuracy. 
 
The Presumption of Identity 
 
The presumption of identity concerns the blood 
alcohol content at the time of driving. Provided 
the preconditions of s.258(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code are met, the accused’s blood alcohol content 
at the time the samples are taken is presumed to 
be the same as when the accused was driving. A 
person can challenge this presumption while still 
accepting readings as accurate, such as through 
late or bolus consumption of alcohol. Thus, a 
challenge to this presumption accepts the reading 
at the time of test, but argues that the reading 
does not properly reflect the blood alcohol level 
at the time of driving.  Once the presumption of 
identity is rebutted, the Crown is required to 
prove blood alcohol level at the time of driving by 
other means, usually by calling an expert to 
interpret the breathalyzer reading back to the 
time of driving. 
 
The Presumption of Accuracy 
 
Section 25(1) of the Interpretation Act, applied 
to s.258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, provides that 
the facts recorded in the certificate of analysis 
are, in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, deemed to be established. A challenge 
to this presumption disputes the reading at the 
time of test. In this case, the accused argues 
that the 130mg% reading is incorrect because he 
did not consume enough alcohol to justify that 
level on the breathalyser. Thus, he challenges the 
presumption of accuracy, not the presumption of 
identity. However, once the presumption of 
accuracy is rebutted, the evidentiary aspect 
remains. In other words, “once an accused 
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successfully rebuts the presumption of accuracy, 
the certificate is no longer deemed to establish 
the blood alcohol content at the time of 
testing…but the certificate remains part of the 
evidence, and it is some evidence of the facts 
contained therein.”  
 
Rebutting the Presumption of Accuracy 
 
After reviewing much jurisprudence in this area 
Justice Jackson, delivering the judgment of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, ruled that 
evidence of low alcohol consumption by itself 
could be capable of rebutting the presumption of 
accuracy. It is not necessary to establish by 
direct evidence breathalyzer malfunction, 
operator error, or contamination. 
 
The Roadside Screening Device Reading 
 
Because the roadside test is compelled and there 
generally is no right to counsel before providing 
the sample, the readings cannot be used to decide 
whether the accused is over 80mg%. However, 
the judge was permitted to use the roadside 
screening result to test the credibility of the 
accused that he only consumed six beer. Justice 
Jackson wrote: 
 
The roadside screening test is not being used, 
on its own, to convict the accused. It is, 
instead, some evidence which the court can 
consider to test the accused’s statement that 
he or she had little to drink and to test the 
inference which flows from that statement 
that the breathalyzer was not working 
properly. 
 
The Criminal Code does not preclude the use 
of the roadside test in this manner. Parliament 
permits the police officer to obtain this 
evidence to confirm suspicion that the driver 
may be over .08. While the accused has no 
option but to provide the sample, it is difficult 
to see where there may be an abuse of 
authority in the way such abuse may arise 
when a confession is obtained. This is not 
compelled action by means of a state official 
against an individual as one would see with 
respect to a confession. In this case, 
Parliament has made the decision that 
individuals must provide a roadside breath 
sample. 
 
Once having obtained the result of the test, it 
forms part of the officer’s reasonable and 
probable grounds to demand samples of the 
accused’s breath. The procedure in this 
jurisdiction is that the arresting officer 
details all of the evidence from the initial 
contact with the accused until a demand is 
made, for the purposes of laying the 
foundation for his or her reasonable and 
probable grounds to have made the demand. 
Thus, the evidence is before the court as part 
of the record.  
 
Until the accused takes the stand and swears 
that he or she consumed little or no alcohol, 
the Crown does not know what the accused’s 
defence will be. In a system which requires 
full Crown disclosure and no defence 
disclosure, it is not unreasonable for the 
Crown, at that point in the trial, to ask the 
court to consider the evidence of the roadside 
screening device to weigh the accused’s 
credibility….[para. 79-82] 
 
Here, there was no evidence the roadside 
screening device was malfunctioning. The officer 
was trained in its operation and the device was 
calibrated to register a fail with a reading of 
100mg% or greater. Justice Jackson concluded 
that the trial judge did not err in rejecting the 
accused’s testimony based on the whole of the 
evidence, including the strength of the 
certificate and the roadside “fail” reading. The 
appeal was allowed, the order granting a new trial 
was set aside, and the conviction was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
WARRANTLESS PLAIN VIEW 
SEIZURE LAWFUL 
R. v. Gibson, 2003 BCSC 1572 
 
A citizen called police to report 
that an unoccupied neighbouring 
house had its front door wide 
open, its lights on, and marihuana 
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plants could be seen inside the house through the 
open doorway. The police attended and found the 
front door broken open, lights on, footprints in 
the fresh snow leading up to the front door and 
around the perimeter of the house, but no 
marihuana plants could be seen. With firearms 
drawn, the officers entered the house to search 
for any suspects who may have broken into the 
house. They smelled marihuana and found a grow 
operation in one of the rooms. No one was found 
in the house nor were there any signs anyone had 
been recently living there. A car drove into the 
driveway and after admitting ownership of the 
room and the plants, the accused was arrested. 
The marihuana plants were then seized without a 
warrant. 
 
During the voir dire to determine the 
admissibility of the evidence the accused 
conceded that the initial police entry and 
preliminary search was lawful, but argued that 
the police could not lawfully seize the plants and 
grow equipment without a warrant. In his 
submission the initial search could only provide 
grounds to support a search warrant application, 
but could not replace the warrant requirement 
for a lawful seizure. Thus, the police violated his 
s.8 Charter right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. On the other 
hand, the Crown submitted that the seizure was 
reasonable under both the common law plain view 
doctrine as well as incidental to arrest.  
 
Justice Halfyard rejected the incidental to 
arrest submission because the arrest was 
effected outside the residence and he was “not 
prepared to say that the room inside the house 
[fell] within the purview of “[the accused’s] 
immediate surroundings.” However, the plain view 
doctrine was applicable. The plain view doctrine 
requires the following essential ingredients: 
 
• “the police officer had lawful, prior 
justification for his or her intrusion into or 
presence at the place where the evidence was 
found; 
• “the police officer discovered the evidence 
inadvertently while in the course of 
exercising a lawful police power or performing 
a lawful police duty; 
 
• “the evidence was in plain view in the sense 
that it was detected through the unaided use 
of the police officer’s senses; and 
 
• “it must have been immediately apparent to 
the police officer that the evidence was 
probably connected with criminal activity. 
 
In this case all of the elements were established. 
The accused failed to establish a Charter 
violation and his application for exclusion was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.bccourts.bc.ca 
 
HYDRO INSPECTION ON 
PROPERTY DOES NOT REQUIRE 
WARRANT 
R. v. Benham, 2003 BCCA 241 
 
After two blown power pole 
transformers outside the 
accused’s residence, an employee 
of B.C. Hydro’s Security Division 
attended the pole to determine what caused the 
problem by checking the wires running to the 
residence. He discovered an excessive amount of 
electricity being used, likely the cause of the two 
transformer failures. He re-attended two days 
later with a colleague to check the meter on the 
outside of the residence. At this time an 
electrical bypass was discovered. The police drug 
unit was notified and a Criminal Code search 
warrant to investigate the theft of electricity 
was obtained. While executing the warrant the 
police discovered a grow operation and 
subsequently obtained a second warrant to search 
the premises under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. Police seized 506 marihuana 
plants and 130 cuttings worth an estimated 
$170,000 if sold by the pound and $425,000 if 
sold by the gram. 
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At his trial, the accused challenged the 
constitutional validity of the British Columbia 
Hydro and Power Authority Electric Tariff which 
gives B.C. Hydro employees access to its 
equipment (meters and other apparatus) on the 
premises of its customers. The trial judge ruled 
against the accused and he was convicted of 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking, cultivation of marihuana, and theft of 
electricity from B.C Hydro. The accused was 
sentenced to a nine month conditional sentence, 
was ordered to pay restitution in the sum of 
$8,511.03 to B.C. Hydro, and his grow equipment 
was forfeited. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the entry of 
the B.C. Hydro employees under the regulation 
violated his s.8 Charter right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The regulation 
reads: 
 
The Authority’s agents and employees shall have, at all 
reasonable times, free access to the equipment 
supplied with electricity and to the Authority’s meters 
and apparatus and the wires leading therefrom on the 
customer’s premises to ascertain the quantity or 
method of use of service. 
 
One of the accused’s submissions contended that 
when Hydro employees use the regulation to 
gather evidence for a criminal theft of electricity 
prosecution, it should be rendered 
unconstitutional because it does not contain prior 
(pre-search) judicial authorization. He asserts 
that the second visit by Hydro employees onto 
the property was to investigate a theft of 
electricity and breached his s.8 Charter rights. 
The information from this visit could therefore 
not be used to obtain the Criminal Code search 
warrant. Since this warrant was invalid, the 
discovery of the grow operation was tainted and 
the subsequent drug warrant was also invalid. In 
the accused’s view, all of the evidence was 
inadmissible and he should have been acquitted. 
The Crown suggested that the regulation allowing 
access by B.C. Hydro employees did not breach 
s.8. 
Justice Low, writing the unanimous judgment, 
rejected the accused argument. He stated: 
 
The relationship between B.C. Hydro and its 
customers is contractual.  The terms of the 
contract are dictated by statute and 
regulation.  When a person signs up for 
electrical service to his home, as the [accused] 
did, he or she agrees to be bound by the terms 
of the contract.  It is apparent that equipment 
of the supplier of the service must be on the 
premises of the consumer.  It would be 
commercially unrealistic for the supplier to be 
denied access to that equipment.  The Tariff 
regulation under attack provides for access 
“at all reasonable times” for meter reading and 
to ensure that the customer is using the 
service properly.  In addition to the possibility 
of theft, there are obvious safety issues that 
B.C. Hydro must address.  Under s. 38 of the 
Utilities Commission Act …B.C. Hydro is under 
a duty to provide a service to the public that 
is “adequate, safe, efficient, just and 
reasonable”. [para. 18] 
 
Although the excessive amount of electricity 
being consumed at the accused’s residence caused 
the employee to suspect that there was a 
marihuana grow operation at the residence, B.C. 
Hydro still had a legitimate commercial interest 
and safety concern in investigating the anomaly 
that appeared to be a theft of electricity. The 
search in this case was conducted by a B.C. Hydro 
employee in accordance with a regulatory scheme 
involving minimal intrusion. The employee 
examined equipment owned by B.C. Hydro situated 
outside the residence in plain view, the 
information obtained was neither intimate nor 
private, and customers have imputed the right of 
Hydro to enter to check equipment. Thus, there is 
a low expectation of privacy when B.C. Hydro 
employees enter onto their customer’s property 
to check equipment.  
 
Investigating the theft of electricity, although a 
criminal offence, does not take the activities of 
B.C. Hydro employees outside the properly 
circumscribed regulatory context into a context 
with purely law enforcement objectives. Provided 
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Hydro limits their entry to inspect equipment 
they own and investigate matters relevant to 
their commodity, the absence of pre-search 
authorization does not render the regulation 
unconstitutional. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.bccourts.bc.ca 
 
HIGHWAY SAFETY REAL 
FACTOR IN STOPPING CAR 
R. v. Coates,  
(2003) Docket: C35204 (OntCA) 
 
Two Ontario police task force 
members investigating a rash of 
violent robberies were patrolling 
the area where the robberies 
had occurred, looking for suspicious vehicles or 
individuals. At 2 am. they noticed a Quebec plated 
vehicle near a commercial area where tourists 
would not be expected. While the car was stopped 
at a red light, one of the officers observed that 
the driver and passenger were not speaking to 
one another and did not appear to “belong 
together”. The passenger looked very nervous and 
was not wearing his seat belt. Both occupants also 
avoided eye contact, staring out the front 
windshield. 
 
When the light turned green, the police followed 
and the car made an abrupt lane change near an 
intersection as if to avoid police contact. The 
police continued to follow and stopped beside the 
car at a red light. Once again, despite the efforts 
of the police to make eye contact, the passenger 
stared straight ahead and refused to look over or 
acknowledge the police. When the light turned 
green, the car remained stationary for several 
seconds before it turned left. The police 
activated the emergency equipment and stopped 
the car. 
 
A black sock-like object was thrown from the 
front passenger window. One of the officer’s 
nudged the object with his foot and several silver 
bullets fell out, forming the belief there was a 
strong possibility there was a firearm in the car. 
However, as a safety precaution the police 
decided to act as if they were unaware of the 
bullets.  
 
The accused, who was the driver, was asked for 
his licence, ownership papers, and insurance and 
told he was being stopped because his passenger 
was not wearing a seatbelt. When asked where he 
was going, the accused replied “McDonald’s”. The 
officer did not believe him because they had just 
passed a McDonald’s. An officer shone his 
flashlight into the car and noted power cords of 
the type associated with radar detectors and 
binoculars under the passenger seat. The officer 
asked if there was a radar detector in the car 
and for the passenger to step out of the car. A 
balaclava and an unfolded city map were observed 
on the back seat when the passenger door was 
opened. 
 
The passenger was escorted back to the police 
car, pat-down searched, and placed in the back 
seat for officer safety concerns. The accused 
was then arrested for having, or being about to 
commit, an indictable offence. He was searched 
and five .38 calibre bullets, a small tape recorder, 
papers, and a large quantity of cash were found in 
his waistband. He was re-arrested, but neither he 
nor his passenger were given their right to 
counsel. A quick interior search of the car 
revealed two full-face balaclavas, a radar 
detector in the glove box, a roll of duct tape in 
the armrest, and the open city map. In the trunk, 
the police found a gym bag, panels for a 
bulletproof vest, a camouflage jacket, and a video 
camera. A follow up search warrant was obtained 
and the police subsequently recovered a .38 
calibre handgun containing hollow point 
ammunition under the back seat along with other 
items from the car. 
 
At the accused’s trial the judge accepted the 
officer’s evidence that the unrestrained 
passenger was not a pretext for the pullover, but 
was a real factor in stopping the car. The police 
had an articulable cause in the circumstances to 
stop the car and there was no s.9 Charter breach. 
The accused was convicted of carrying 
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ammunition without lawful excuse in a careless 
manner and possession of a restricted firearm 
under the Criminal Code. 
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that the police did not have an 
articulable cause to stop the car and therefore 
he was arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the 
Charter. The search and seizure that followed 
was therefore unreasonable and the evidence 
should have been excluded.  
 
The Stop 
 
A stop will not be arbitrary and thus comport 
with the requirements of s.9 if the police have an 
articulable cause to justify the detention. In 
referencing previous case law on articulable 
cause, Justice Weiler for the unanimous court 
wrote: 
 
[A]rticulable cause is "a constellation of 
objectively discernible facts which give the 
detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect 
that the detainee is implicated in the activity 
under investigation." In ascertaining whether 
articulable cause exists the court must have 
regard to the facts and circumstances as a 
whole, rather than isolating each in turn and 
must be satisfied that there are bona fide 
clearly expressed and factually objective 
reasons justifying not only the detention of 
the suspect but also the extent and nature of 
the investigation. [para. 3] 
 
In this case the police provided two clearly 
expressed specific factors as grounds justifying 
the stop under s.216(1) of Ontario’s Highway 
Traffic Act; the seatbelt infraction and the 
abrupt lane change (which the officer associated  
with the possibility of an impaired driver). The 
trial judge concluded that these factors were not 
used as a pretext for the stop and it was not 
unreasonable for him to conclude that highway 
safety was one of the real reasons for the stop. 
As well, the police had an articulable cause to 
briefly detain the accused for investigative 
reasons other than highway safety matters. 
Justice Weiler stated: 
 
In the context of the investigation of the 
recent robberies, the time of night, the area 
of the stop, and the other observations 
demonstrating that the [accused] and his 
passenger were acting suspiciously and 
evasively, the police had articulable cause to 
detain the [accused] for brief investigative 
purposes. [The officer] had an objective 
factual basis that gave rise to his suspicion 
and this basis rose above the level of a mere 
hunch. The existence of other lawful police 
purposes such as investigation of other 
criminal activity and intelligence gathering, in 
addition to highway safety concerns, does not 
taint the lawfulness of the stop [para.26, 
references omitted] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
PLAYING N-A-M-E GAME 
RESULTS IN CONVICTION 
R. v. Hyde, 2003 BCSC 368 
 
Occasionally, it takes a full 
reading of an entire case to get a 
clear picture of what exactly has 
transpired in court. This is one 
such case. The full Supreme Court of British 
Columbia excerpt as reported is provided for your 
reading pleasure: 
 
[1] THE COURT:  This is an appeal from a 
deemed conviction for speeding against a 
municipal sign under the Motor Vehicle 
Act, s. 146(7). 
[2] The circumstances of the conviction are 
unusual.  The matter was set for trial and 
then adjourned to May 28th, 2003.  It 
came before a Justice of the Peace in 
traffic court in Port Coquitlam.  The 
transcript of the proceedings in court at 
the time the matter was scheduled to 
proceed reads as follows: 
 
THE COURT:  David Hyde. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  Yeah, I'm here in 
relation to that matter, sir. 
THE COURT:  Thank you. 
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[3] Other matters were then spoken to.  The 
transcript continues: 
 
THE COURT:  David Hyde.  Are you ready to 
proceed, Mr. Hyde? 
 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  I am the -- I am 
the -- I'm here concerning that matter 
and I am - 
 THE COURT:  Are you David Hyde? 
 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  I am the secured 
party, sir. 
THE COURT:  Are you David Hyde or not? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  But I don't know 
what name you've got written up there. 
THE COURT:  Well, I've got David Hyde.  If 
you're not David Hyde, you can leave the 
court area.  You are David Hyde? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  I can't answer 
that without seeing the words you have 
written there. 
THE COURT:  Okay, then just move.  Okay, you 
can move now.  I'm going to declare that 
the charge is not disputed because Mr. 
Hyde is not present.  So you're free to 
go.  Okay? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  Well, sir, I'd like 
to read what I have to say. 
THE COURT:  Well, no.  All I want to know is if 
you're David Hyde. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  If -- if it is the 
same name as the sheet outside, no, I'm 
not that man. 
THE COURT:  That's not what I'm asking.  I'm 
asking if you are David Hyde.  Are you 
David Hyde or not? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  I am the secured 
party and I am the creditor – 
THE COURT:  Okay, I'm going to take that as 
a no.  You're free to go.  Officer, would 
you escort this gentleman, who does not 
want to admit his identity, out of the 
courtroom.  I'm going to treat it as not 
disputed due to the non-appearance of Mr. 
Hyde. 
[4] Mr. Hyde informed me today that on the 
court docket his name was spelled in 
capital letters.  He identified himself 
today as David, spelled capital D, lower 
case a-v-i-d, capital J, lower case o-h-n, 
capital E, lower case d-w-i-n, capital H, 
lower case y-d-e.   
[5] It is Mr. Hyde's position that he has 
registered as a trade name the name 
DAVID JOHN EDWIN HYDE in capital 
letters.  He takes the position that the 
effect of so doing is to create an identity 
other than himself, which is DAVID 
JOHN EDWARD HYDE, all in capital 
letters.  He has registered this trade 
name, and a number of other permutations 
and combinations of his name, with the 
Secretary of State for Canada and 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade for Canada.  He is 
of the view that, because the judge was 
reading from a name in capital letters 
when he read out the name David Hyde, he 
was not reading the name of the person 
David Hyde.  He concludes from that that 
he was not required to answer that name 
because his name was not called.   
[6] He takes one further position on this 
application, and that is that when the 
judge endorsed the court record, he 
endorsed "No one responded to the call 
for David Hyde.  One disputant did step 
up, but would not not agree that he is 
David Hyde."  Mr. Hyde today submits 
that the court record, by use of a double 
negative, has confirmed the positive; that 
is, that the disputant that stepped up did 
agree that he was David Hyde.   
[7] The official record of the court 
proceedings is the transcript from which I 
quoted earlier.  That transcript clearly 
indicates that the appellant's name David 
Hyde was called out in open court at the 
time that the case, which had been 
adjourned from another day, was 
scheduled to proceed.  That is the regular 
procedure of the court.  Mr. Hyde takes a 
technical position that is without merit.  
It is clear that his name was called.  I am 
satisfied that he was present and would 
not answer. 
[8] In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied 
the Justice of the Peace was fully 
justified in treating the traffic ticket as 
not disputed and entering a deemed 
conviction.  Accordingly, I am going to 
dismiss Mr. Hyde's appeal. (EXCERPT 
CONCLUDED) 
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’GIVE ME THE FIVE YEARS & 
SHUT UP!’ 
R. v. Galt, 2003 BCPC 0160 
 
Once in a while an accused wants 
to go to jail. Read this exchange 
that occurred in British Columbia 
Provincial Court between Justice 
Angelomatis and an accused who pleads for 5 
years in prison. 
 
[1] THE COURT: There is an unusual fact 
pattern in this case and that is that Mr. 
Galt committed a robbery which he 
brandished a cloth over part of his hand, 
pretending there was a gun. What is 
unusual about this matter is that he 
subsequently turned himself in to the 
police. 
[2] There, however, in the background of Mr. 
Galt is a great deal of self-pity and a 
great deal of under-reporting and a great 
deal of minimizing what he has done. I am 
concerned about some of his past crimes, 
but I am not sentencing him for those 
past crimes. The incidents he mentions 
with respect to the sexual assaults, what 
he tells the probation officer and what he 
tells the psychiatrists are evidently at 
odds with the police reports. I do not 
know which is correct and, as I say, I am 
not punishing him for those crimes.  
[3] However, reports by his collateral 
associates, namely stepsisters, sisters and 
family, show that he has had a continuing 
history in the past of being a bully and 
being oppressive and belligerent and 
aggressive and violent towards people.  
[4] I am troubled by one of the things that is 
in the pre-sentence report, but again, I 
am not sentencing because of this. On 
page 11 on the faxed report, he says that 
he was coerced by - and he says it is not 
the Hell's Angels - but he was coerced by 
persons to commit a crime. He says that 
he owed his captors $1800 for uncut 
cocaine worth, in his opinion, $3,000. That 
cocaine had been seized by the Vancouver 
Police. So I take it that that cocaine was 
cocaine that he would have possessed, 
whether for his own use or for 
trafficking. But he goes on to say, "During 
those two days, I made over 15 grand for 
them and this was the last job." What I 
take from that - and I am not sentencing 
for it - is he has done other robberies, 
other crimes in that two-day period that 
he is not being called to account for. If he 
truly was repented and he truly was 
remorseful, I would have thought he would 
have made a clean breast of it all. 
[5] He has, in here, made a statement that he 
wishes to reconnect with society and to 
get some treatment and, to his credit, he 
understands and acknowledges that the 
only place he is going to get this is in the 
federal system. 
[6] The Crown has indicated that they want 
three years. I would have given him more, 
regardless of the fact he turned himself 
in, but I am going to acquiesce in what, in 
effect, is a joint submission. Mr. Flerlage 
feels it should be at the lesser end of 
federal time, i.e. two years, two-and-a-
half years. Three years is what the Crown 
asked for, three years is what I am going 
to give him. I feel that a sentence of five 
to six years would have been eminently 
justified. 
[7] However, I take some solace in the fact 
that he is only 34 years old. I see there is 
present, in the gallery, acquaintances or 
relatives, so he does have some support 
system. I also feel that he has the 
background, I would think, to reconnect. 
He has evidently First Nation roots. He is 
not proud of them or, if he is proud, he 
has not acknowledged them and does not 
seek help from the First Nations. The 
First Nations are now in a voyage of 
discovery, in that their historical 
oppression has been recognized, the 
government gives them money, there are 
programs where First Nations persons can 
avail them of it, and Mr. Galt clearly is not 
someone who has his own inner resources 
to find redemption or to be reformed and 
rehabilitated on his own resources. He 
should use whatever resources he can 
find. 
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[8] THE DEFENDANT: Christ, give me the five 
years and shut up! 
[9] THE COURT: Yeah, well, you know, if that 
is what you want to hear, that is what you 
want to hear. You are indicating you have 
not seen the path, you have not seen the 
light, and you are not going to unless you 
start -- 
[10]THE DEFENDANT: Well, you haven't even 
listened to a f.... thing that was said here 
today. 
[11]THE COURT: I have read it all, and I do 
not think you have read it and you have 
not understood it very well. 
[12]THE DEFENDANT: I read both. 
[13]THE COURT: Okay. And in there, you seem 
to be blaming everybody but yourself. 
[14]THE DEFENDANT: You haven't read 
nothin'. You're f.... daft. 
[15]THE COURT: Okay. Okay, good. I will leave 
it. He has expressed himself. Three years. 
[16]THE DEFENDANT: F.... goof! 
[17]THE COURT: See, I should have given him 
four! 
[18]I will find hardship. There is no way he is 
going to pay the victim surcharge. 
[19]Maybe I should torture him more with 
reasons for judgment. Do you want to 
bring him back?! (EXCERPT CONCLUDED) 
  
‘10-8’ GOES PRIME TIME 
 
“10-8” can now be seen Sunday 
at 8 pm. (PST) on ABC. Of 
course, we are not referring to 
a television version of the “In 
Service: 10-8” newsletter, 
but a new fall police drama 
series by the same name, “10-8”. This series takes 
place in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department and explores the relationship 
between Sheriff’s rookies and their training 
officers. For more information, check out 
www.ABC.com. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Character is much easier kept than recovered—
Thomas Paine 
CONSENT SEARCH OBTAINED 
FOLLOWING TRAFFIC STOP  
R. v Sewell, 2003 SKCA 52 
 
A Saskatchewan police officer 
stopped a British Columbia 
license plated vehicle on the 
TransCanada highway to issue a 
warning ticket after the driver failed to slow as 
he entered a reduced speed zone. When asking 
the accused for his drivers licence and vehicle 
registration, the officer noted his eyes were red 
and that he was slow to react to the questions. 
When asked where he was coming from and going 
to, the accused replied he was travelling from 
Toronto to British Columbia. Concerned about his 
sobriety and with safety, the officer asked the 
accused to come back to the police car. The 
accused was placed in the rear of the police car, 
but could not exit unless the officer allowed him 
to do so. A computer check was conducted and 
CPIC reported a conviction for theft while PIRS 
indicated he was a suspect in a marihuana 
cultivation.  
 
After giving the accused a warning ticket, the 
officer told him he was done with the traffic 
stop, that he was free to go, and his documents 
were returned. However, the officer acquired a 
new suspicion that the accused may be 
transporting or in possession of illegal 
contraband. The officer told the accused he 
would like to discuss his trip. He advised him he 
did not have to say anything, that if he did talk it 
could be used as evidence, and also of his rights 
to a lawyer and legal aid.  The accused was 
nervous and shaking. The officer discussed 
contraband and smuggling on the highway. The 
officer asked if there were any weapons, tobacco, 
alcohol, drugs or money in the vehicle. The 
accused replied no, but his carotid was pulsing 
very hard. 
 
The officer admitted at trial that he asked all 
these questions with a view in obtaining consent 
to search the vehicle. The officer asked the 
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accused if he minded him looking through his 
truck, a Ford Escape. He replied, “Yeah, I guess 
you can go through it.” The accused was assured 
that he could stop the search at any time. Both 
left the police car and the officer again told the 
accused he could withdraw his consent at anytime 
without consequence. After entering his vehicle 
to put away the documents, the accused unlocked 
and opened the back door. Smelling a strong 
odour of raw marihuana, the officer took hold of 
a duffle bag tucked in amongst other luggage and 
pulled the bag closer. At this point the accused 
informed the officer he was withdrawing his 
consent. He was arrested for possession of 
marihuana, advised of his right to counsel and 
given the police caution. The accused was 
searched and $2,280 in cash was found in his 
pocket. In the duffle bag, police located 3 kgs. of 
marihuana. 
 
At trial the accused was convicted of possession 
of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, but appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. Although he 
conceded the initial stop and detention for 
speeding under Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic 
Act was lawful, he argued that the continued 
detention in the back of the police car once the 
traffic matter was concluded was arbitrary under 
s.9 of the Charter, which in turn played a 
determinative role in the s.8 Charter breach for 
which he was seeking a remedy.  
 
He submitted that the initial search was 
involuntary and compelled by the physical 
detention in the rear of the police car and the 
imminent possibility of further police sanction. 
The Crown contended however, that the initial 
search was conducted with informed consent and 
once the accused revoked that consent, the 
officer had the authority to arrest the accused 
and continue a search incidental to arrest. For 
the purposes of its decision, the Court examined 
the search question in two phases; the first phase 
(pre-arrest) consisted of the search up to the 
point where the officer reached for the duffle 
bag and was asked to stop searching and the 
second phase (post arrest) where the officer 
searched the duffel bag, the vehicle, and the 
accused subsequent to the arrest.  
 
The Pre-Arrest Search 
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the detention was 
arbitrary under the Charter because “it is not the 
existence of “arbitrariness” that ultimately 
determines whether the consent was voluntary 
and thus valid”. Even if the detention was 
arbitrary, it is still possible to give valid consent. 
Adopting the Wills8 test (an Ontario Court of 
Appeal decision) for informed consent, the court 
noted that  the Crown must prove, on a balance of 
probabilities, that: 
 
i. there was a consent, express or implied; 
ii. the giver of the consent had the authority 
to give the consent in question; 
iii. the consent was voluntary…and was not 
the product of police oppression, coercion 
or other external conduct which negated 
the freedom to choose whether or not to 
allow the police to pursue the course of 
conduct requested; 
iv. the giver of the consent was aware of the 
nature of the police conduct to which he 
or she was being asked to consent; 
v. the giver of the consent was aware of his 
or her right to refuse to permit the police 
to engage in the conduct requested, and 
vi. the giver of the consent was aware of the 
potential consequences of giving the 
consent. [para. 17, references omitted] 
 
In this case, the Court had no problem holding 
that conditions i, ii, or iv were met. As for 
condition v, the Court stated: 
 
The officer told the [accused] twice that he 
could stop the search at any time. Indeed, at a 
critical point, the [accused] asserted his right 
to stop the search. Obviously, he always new 
he had the right to refuse his consent to 
search. [para. 20] 
 
                                                 
8 R. v. Willis (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529. 
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And for condition vi: 
 
The evidence also leaves no doubt about the 
presence of requirement (vi). Before obtaining 
the [accused’s] consent, the officer took 
considerable pains to alert the [accused] to 
the potential consequences that could befall 
him should some contraband be found in his 
vehicle as a result of a search. The [accused] 
characterizes those efforts not as a drawing 
to the [accused’s] attention the potential 
consequences that could befall him, but as a 
form of compulsion that vitiates the consent 
he gave the officer. It is my view that there is 
no good reason whatever not to accept the 
officer's reasons and explanation for his 
describing to the [accused] what has happened 
in the past to persons he found transporting 
contraband. It was the officer's way of 
outlining the potential consequences of the 
[accused’s] giving his consent to a search. In 
other words, the officer was endeavouring to 
comply with requirement (vi). I, therefore, 
have no difficulty in finding the Crown 
satisfied the onus placed on it respecting 
requirement (vi). [para. 21] 
 
This left condition iii; was the consent voluntary? 
The type of police oppression or coercion to 
vitiate the voluntary nature of consent requires 
more that the sense of oppression and compulsion 
even experienced and sophisticated persons will 
feel when stopped by the police. It requires 
oppression or coercion procured by intimidating 
conduct or by threats of force and must be more 
than the oppression or coercion inherent in every 
detention by police. Justice Bayda held: 
 
In the present case, the arbitrary detention 
(if that is what it was) of the [accused] in the 
backseat of the police car is a factor to 
consider in deciding whether there was 
oppression or coercion …but it is only one 
factor. By far, the most important factors are 
whether there was any "intimidating conduct" 
or "force or threats of force" by the police 
officer and whether that conduct or force or 
those threats of force procured the consent. 
The evidence in the present case reveals no 
such conduct, force or threats of force. In 
the light of that, the only conclusion one can 
draw is that the consent given by the 
[accused] in the backseat of the car was 
"voluntary…." 
 
Another important factor to consider is the 
nature of the consent. It was revocable and, 
thus, had a continuous quality. There was not a 
one-shot feature to it. Because it could be 
withdrawn at any time, there was, in a sense, a 
fresh consent every moment or every few 
seconds from the time it was first given until 
it was eventually withdrawn. Given that quality, 
the force, such as it was, of the [accused’s] 
contention that the consent was given in the 
context of an arbitrary detention while in the 
backseat of the police car, was considerably 
reduced, if not entirely dissipated, by his 
failure to withdraw the consent after he left 
the police car and before the search began. 
The [accused] was then not under any 
detention, arbitrary or otherwise, as the 
officer earlier told him he was "free to go." 
But he remained and allowed his consent to 
continue, and actively assisted the officer in 
the search by opening some bags. Moreover, 
the fact that at one point in the search the 
[accused] withdrew his consent is strong 
evidence that he was not under the influence 
of any sort of threat, intimidation or coercion. 
[paras. 27-28, references omitted] 
 
The Arrest 
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal then went on 
to consider the legality of the arrest. Having 
found the search up until the point the accused 
withdrew his consent lawful, the court found the 
odour of marihuana sufficient to warrant the 
arrest of the accused as a person found 
committing a criminal offence under s.495(1)(b) 
of the Criminal Code, which reads: 
 
s.495(1)(b) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…(b) a 
person whom he finds committing a criminal offence. 
 
Justice Bayda wrote: 
 
It is clause 495(1)(b) that governs in this case. 
The [accused] at the time of his arrest was 
committing an offence (consisting of 
possession of marijuana) and the officer found 
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him to be committing that offence. This is, 
therefore, not a case of the officer needing 
the "reasonable grounds" contemplated by 
clause 495(1)(a). 
 
The question arises whether it is fair to 
conclude that the officer had, for the 
purposes of s. 495(1)(b), "found" the [accused] 
committing the offence at the time of the 
arrest given that the officer had only smelled 
the marijuana but had not seen it. In my 
respectful view, it is fair to so conclude. In 
order for a person to know or believe that 
there is marijuana in the immediate vicinity, he 
or she would have to rely on one or more of his 
or her five senses. (Admittedly, one cannot 
"hear" marijuana, but one can "hear" someone 
telling one of the presence of marijuana.) 
Normally it is the sense of sight alone, often 
the sense of sight coupled with the sense of 
smell, and at times the sense of smell alone 
that alerts one to the presence of marijuana. 
If, through experience, a person's sense of 
smell for marijuana is as highly developed as 
his sense of sight for marijuana, it undermines 
logic to discount or discard the knowledge 
acquired through his sense of smell but accept 
the knowledge acquired through his sense of 
sight. Knowledge is knowledge, whether 
acquired through one sense, more than one 
sense, or all the senses. In the present case, it 
is fair and reasonable to infer from the 
officer's testimony-testimony that was not 
disputed-that he had knowledge of the 
presence of marijuana in the vehicle, as a 
result of his smelling the marijuana in 
question, without having seen it. 
 
The [accused] raised the question whether the 
officer's presence at the back of the 
[accused’s] vehicle where he could smell the 
marijuana should be adjudged an unlawful 
presence given that it occurred only because 
of "a non-consensual search" brought about by 
coercion, an arbitrary detention and a denial 
of the [accused’s] right to retain and instruct 
counsel. The short answer to the question is 
that the search was not a "non-consensual 
search" for the reasons I have outlined and 
the officer's presence was, therefore, not 
unlawful. In those reasons I specifically dealt 
with the issues of coercion and arbitrary 
detention. As for the contention that the 
[accused] was denied his right to retain and 
instruct counsel, it is apparent from the 
officer's testimony that he did, indeed, advise 
the [accused] of that right while both were in 
the police car immediately after the officer 
had concluded dealing with the Highway 
Traffic matters. The [accused] at no time 
asserted this right. This contention comes to 
naught. 
 
Even if I were to find that the officer's 
presence at the back of the vehicle was 
unlawful for the reasons contended by the 
[accused], I would be hard pressed to find 
that the officer lacked authority to arrest the 
[accused] for an offence he found him 
committing. By way of analogy, I offer this set 
of circumstances. A police officer unlawfully 
enters a dwelling house. That unlawfulness is 
rooted in a breach of one of the occupant's 
Charter rights. He finds the occupant pointing 
a gun at another person who is strapped to a 
chair in a distraught state. Is the officer 
precluded from arresting that occupant for 
committing the offence of forcible 
confinement on the ground that he, the 
officer, unlawfully entered the dwelling house? 
I would find it very odd, indeed, if a breach of 
the occupant's Charter right brought about 
such a result. [paras. 35-38] 
 
Post Arrest Search 
 
Since the arrest was lawful, the officer was 
entitled to search the contents of the vehicle and 
the person of the accused as an incident to the 
arrest. Furthermore, the police had reasonable 
and probable grounds to continue the search9.   
 
The accused’s s.8 Charter right was not violated 
and therefore it was unnecessary to consider 
exclusion under s.24(2). However, the appeal was 
allowed on other procedural grounds. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
                                                 
9 In compliance with the earlier Saskatchewan Court of Appeal search case R. v. 
(D.)I.D. (1987), 60 Sask. R. 72 (C.A.). 
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DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that Los Angeles Police Department employees 
may receive a $500 bonus if they refer an 
officer for lateral transfer to the department 
and that officer is subsequently hired. (The Beat, 
Volume XLIX No.8, August 2003) 
 
‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter would like to 
share some of our 
readers’ comments about 
the publication. We 
appreciate the kind words 
we have received and look forward to future 
editions: 
*************** 
“Could you please e-mail [the newsletter] to me at 
the Police Station so that I can print it and put it 
out for the other members to read it. I read a 
few articles and they are very interesting and 
relevant.”  Police Constable, New Brunswick 
*************** 
“I look forward to each new issue you put out 
however sometimes at work it gets hoarded by 
someone. This way I can read it at home at my 
leisure.”  Police Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“We here at the…Criminal Intelligence Section 
have had the opportunity to see some issues of 
your publication. We would very much appreciate 
it if we could be added to your distribution list.” 
Police Sergeant, British Columbia 
*************** 
“I am a “fan” of your “In Service: 10-8 
Newsletter” and look forward to reading them as 
they come into our Training office.” Police 
Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“The newsletter is greatly appreciated.” Police 
Constable, RCMP British Columbia 
 
“I am an instructor…[and one] of my cadets sent 
me a copy of your monthly newsletter and to put 
it mildly I was very impressed.” Police Corporal, 
RCMP Saskatchewan 
*************** 
“Just reading through your latest newsletter...you 
do one hell of a good job - keep it up, and thanks.” 
Canadian Fisheries Officer 
*************** 
“I was just back at my home agency…and came 
across a couple issues of your publication.  Two 
things, this is an excellent publication.  I have 
been off the road now for a number of years and 
I may be heading back there in the not so distant 
future.  I haven't been able to read the 
publications from cover to cover yet but you bet 
I will and I feel confident they will bring me up to 
speed on what to do and not to do when I get 
back in uniform. Thanks!” Police Officer, British 
Columbia 
*************** 
“Could you please add me to your list of recipients 
for the “In Service 10-8 material…[they are] 
terrific articles…” Police Constable, RCMP 
British Columbia 
*************** 
“I have had the opportunity to access your 
publication and find it tremendously informative. 
Keep up the excellent work.” Inspector, RCMP 
British Columbia 
*************** 
“Once again, on behalf of all of us here, thanks 
very much for a very informative and topical 
publication. Keep up the great work! We really 
appreciate it!” Federal Wildlife Officer, 
Environment Canada 
*************** 
“Thanks again from eastern Canada! We still enjoy 
your news letter. I print it off faithfully to 
supply our shift NCO’s and place a copy on our 
training board. We also have linked to your 
website. Keep up the great work…it is truly 
appreciated!” Police Corporal, New Brunswick 
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CLASS 93 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 93 as qualified 
municipal constables on November 
14, 2003. 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Atousa Arjangpour 
Cst. Katie Asplin 
Cst. Derek Baker 
Cst. Chris Brown-John 
Cst. Karen Twardy 
DELTA  
Cst. Chris Anzulovich 
Cst. Ray Basran 
Cst. David Ogilvy 
NEW WESTMINSTER 
Cst. Rochelle Desranleau 
Cst. David Dorazio 
PORT MOODY 
Cst. Brad Sheridan 
VICTORIA 
Cst. Wayne Cox 
Cst. Theresa Tuttle 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Daniel Ballinger 
Cst. Mark Bouchey 
Cst. Russell Brown 
Cst. Rebecca Chandler 
Cst. Darren Edwards 
Cst. Kairns Graham 
Cst. Natasha Holdal 
Cst. Shane Kolb 
Cst. Todd Lefebvre 
Cst. Trever Lowe 
Cst. Eugene Lum 
Cst. Michael MacPherson 
Cst. Bruno Raffele 
Cst. Erin Riste 
Cst. Sukhvinder Sunger 
Cst. Drew Turner 
Cst. Sean Ward 
 
Congratulations to Cst. David Ogilvy 
(Delta), who was the recipient of the 
British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for 
best all around recruit performance 
in basic training. Cst. Natasha Holdal (Vancouver) 
received the Abbotsford Police Association Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. 
Cst. Rebecca Chandler (Vancouver) and Cst. David 
Ogilvy (Delta) received the Vancouver Police Union 
Excellence in Academics award for best academic 
test results in all disciplines. Cst. Derek Baker 
(Abbotsford) received the British Columbia 
Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian award 
for being selected by his peers to represent his 
class at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Trever Lowe 
(Vancouver) was the recipient of the Abbotsford 
Police Recruit Marksmanship award for highest 
qualification score during Block 3 training. RCMP 
Chief Superintendent Stu Cameron, OIC Human 
Resources, was the keynote speaker at the 
ceremony. 
PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE:  
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN 
FUNNIER THAN FICTION 
collected by Constable Ian Barraclough 
 
The Curse of the Mummy 
 
When Bill Sokolik buzzed a 
stranger into the Edmonton-
based Jehovah’s Witness 
Kingdom Hall last September, 
the first thing through the 
door of the church was a 24 
inch long Samurai sword. An 
apparition straight out of Curse of the Mummy 
followed. Anthony Alan Burton, the man who then 
entered to terrorize and rob the Jehovah's 
Witness church had lengths of hospital gauze 
wrapped over the top of his head. His face was 
covered with silicone caulking putty and he had 
smeared pink foundation makeup over the putty. 
To add to the effect, his eyes were obscured by a 
large pair of glasses.  
 
"I am the evil that you have read about," the 42-
year-old Burton yelled out to the terrified 
worshippers in the hall that Tuesday night. "This 
is the face of evil." When Burton burst into the 
hall, children and women began screaming. Burton 
ignored their screams and instructed some of the 
men to collect cash and credit cards. To add 
emphasis to his words, Burton slashed a chair 
seven times with his sword, then grabbed a 
churchgoer and put the blade to the man's neck 
before releasing him. 
 
At the back of the church, a woman pulled a 
cellphone from her pocket and dialled 911. Police 
arrived within five minutes. Pistol in hand, the 
first officer through the door of the church was 
Rick Franchuk, a self-described "constable-for-
life." Franchuk yelled out to Burton to drop the 
sword. Burton instead tried to grab a woman but 
missed. He grabbed another woman by the shirt 
but let go when a churchgoer seized his arm. "I 
don't want to," he yelled when Franchuk 
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demanded again that he drop the sword. "Shoot 
me! Shoot me!" 
 
Franchuk held his fire. Burton finally dropped his 
sword but still wouldn't surrender. "That's okay. 
I have more knives and weapons," he said. Burton 
finally surrendered and police found a medieval-
style mace in the pocket of his knee-length 
overcoat. Fastened to his leg with electrical tape 
was a 30-cm kitchen knife. 
During his sentencing hearing, Burton's lawyer 
produced reports from three psychiatrists and 
one psychologist which described how his client 
had been clinically depressed at the time of his 
madcap robbery attempt. Burton had run out of 
his medication several days earlier. (Edited and 
excerpted from an article in The Edmonton 
Journal) 
 
Radar Gun almost Vaporizes Two Traffic 
Cops 
 
Two traffic patrol officers in 
the United Kingdom got more 
than they bargained for last 
month while trying out a state-
of-the-art radar gun. The 
traffic cops were on patrol 
checking for speeding motorists on the A1 
motorway in Northern England using a brand new 
hand-held radar device. 
While trapping unwary motorists on the 
Edinburgh to London highway, the radar gun 
suddenly malfunctioned.  
 
As one of the unnamed officers used the device 
to check the speed of an approaching vehicle, he 
was shocked to find that his target had 
registered a speed in excess of 400 miles per 
hour! The £8,000 radar gun then seized up and 
could not be reset by the bemused policemen. 
 
The radar had in fact latched on to a NATO 
Tornado Strike aircraft approaching them from 
the North Sea. The fighter plane was taking part 
in a simulated low-flying exercise over Southern 
Scotland. After an official investigation by the 
Chief Constable of the Lothian & Borders Police 
force to the RAF liaison office, it was revealed 
that the traffic cops had had a lucky escape.  
 
The tactical onboard computer of the Tornado 
not only detected and jammed what it believe was 
"hostile" radar equipment, but then automatically 
armed and zeroed in an air-to-ground missile 
ready to “neutralize” the perceived threat. 
Luckily the Dutch pilot was alerted to the missile 
status and was able to override the automatic 
protection system before the missile launched.  
Lothian & Border Police Department have declined 
to comment, although it is understood that 
traffic cops in the vicinity will be more careful in 
future when pointing their radar guns. 
Edited and excerpted from an article from the 
Berwickshire Gazette 
 
Smuggling your service pistol over the 
border, not such a good idea. 
 
A Detroit police officer 
accidentally shot himself in the 
leg when he tried to hide his gun 
after his car was pulled over by 
Canada Customs while crossing 
from the United States. Michael 
Allen, 22, was heading to Windsor in the early 
hours when a customs officer at the Ambassador 
Bridge directed the off-duty Detroit policeman 
to take his car to an inspection area. 
 
After parking the car, Officer Allen is believed 
to have pulled his service Glock pistol from a leg 
holster in an attempt to hide it under the car's 
front seat. While attempting to conceal his pistol 
the trigger was pulled discharging a .40 calibre 
bullet which immediately went through a bone in 
his leg.  
 
Officer Allen was rushed to hospital where he 
underwent an eight-hour operation to save his leg. 
The Detroit cop is facing numerous charges under 
the Criminal Code and the Customs Act, although 
none have yet been filed. Windsor police said he 
should have simply checked his gun in and picked 
it up on the way back.  
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Edited and excerpted from an article at 
www.Canada.com 
 
From Police Blotters  
 
(1) In Tennessee in September, Thomas 
McGouey, apparently set on committing 
suicide, painted a bull's-eye on his body 
before arranging a standoff in which he 
pointed a gun at police officers so they would 
kill him in self-defence. McGouey's scheme 
failed because Knox County sheriff's 
deputies, who fired 28 shots at him, missed 
with their first 27 rounds, and only managed 
to graze his shoulder with the last shot fired. 
(Knoxville News-Sentinel). 
 
(2) Wayne Leonard Hoffman, 45, was arrested 
for impaired driving at a gas station in 
Minnetonka, Minnesota where he was 
"attempting to add air to his vehicle's tires 
using a vacuum cleaner" (Lakeshore Weekly 
News).  
 
(3) Two Wyoming men were feuding over a 
parking space at a K-Mart when one drove 
alongside the other and spit at him through 
his open window. According to the police 
occurrence report, "As the victim saw the 
projected body fluid travelling through the 
air, he dropped his jaw in shock, and the 
phlegm landed square in his mouth where he 
swallowed it in a gag reflex." (Jackson Hole 
News & Guide).  
 
(4) NYPD officers Paul Damore and Farrell 
Conroy were briefly suspended without pay 
for their conduct in the 45th Precinct station 
house in the Bronx, when they got into a 
fistfight over which one would get drive their 
patrol car. (NYPD News). 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Whatever your grade or position, if you know how 
and when to speak, and when to remain silent, 
your chances of real success are proportionately 
increased—Ralph C. Smedley 
FULL OFFENCE REQUIRES 
OVERLAP OF ACTUS REUS  & 
MENS REA   
R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 
 
The accused and the complainant 
had a relationship with each 
other that included sexual 
intercourse.  During the 
relationship the accused took a 
medical test and discovered he was HIV positive. 
Although he was told of his duty to disclose his 
status to his sexual partners, he did not tell the 
complainant. Five days later, the complainant took 
an HIV test for unknown reasons and tested 
negative. She told the accused of the negative 
test and the relationship continued for another 
year.  After 18 months the relationship 
terminated. Over two years later the complainant 
took a second test after she became concerned 
she was displaying HIV symptoms. This time she 
tested positive.  
 
The accused was charged with aggravated assault, 
criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and 
common nuisance. At his trial, the accused 
conceded that he infected the complainant and 
that she would have never consented to sex had 
she known he was HIV infected. However, HIV 
has an incubation period and it was quite possible 
that even when the complainant tested negative 
the first time, she may have already contracted 
the virus from the accused.   
 
The judge convicted him of aggravated assault 
and common nuisance, but acquitted him of 
criminal negligence causing bodily harm. On 
appeal, his conviction for aggravated assault was 
allowed and a conviction for attempted 
aggravated assault was substituted by the 
majority of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal.  
The Crown further appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada arguing that the accused should 
have been convicted of aggravated assault, not 
simply an attempt.  
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Aggravated Assault 
 
The offence of aggravated assault reads: 
 
s.268(1) Criminal Code 
Every one commits an aggravated assault who wounds, 
maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the 
complainant. 
 
Criminal offences require the coexistence of an 
actus reus and a mens rea. The mens rea for 
aggravated assault requires: 
• the same mens rea required for assault;  
o intent to apply force intentionally; or 
o intent to apply force recklessly; or 
o being wilfully blind to the fact that the 
victim does not consent; and 
• objective foresight of the risk of bodily 
harm.  
 
The actus reus of aggravated assault requires: 
• proof of physical contact inflicted by the 
accused on the complainant,  
• the absence of valid consent. In this case, 
although the complainant consented to sexual 
intercourse, she never consented to sexual 
intercourse with an HIV positive partner. 
Without the accused disclosing his HIV 
status, properly informed consent was not 
given. When a person intentionally, recklessly, 
or through willful blindness places a partner 
at significant risk, the consent to sexual 
intercourse is vitiated; and 
• one of the aggravating consequences 
(wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or 
endangering the life). 
 
To obtain a conviction for aggravated assault in 
this case, the prosecution would have to prove 
that the mens rea (knowledge of the accused’s 
HIV status) coincided with the actus reus 
(endangerment to life of the complainant). In 
other words, the accused’s knowledge of his HIV 
status must overlap with when he infected the 
complainant. If he infected the complainant 
before he was aware of his HIV status, there was 
endangerment but no intent. If the complainant 
had already been infected before the accused 
was aware of his status, there was intent, but a 
reasonable doubt concerning endangerment. In 
this case, it was unclear whether the victim 
contracted the virus before or after the accused 
became aware of his status and there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that further 
exposure to unprotected sex between infected 
partners increases risk. Thus, without proof as to 
the actual timing of the victim’s infection, there 
was no way of knowing whether the mensa rea and 
actus reus coexisted.  
 
An attempted crime, on the other hand, requires 
the intent to commit the complete crime (mens 
rea), but an incomplete actus reus (provided 
sufficient steps beyond mere preparation have 
occurred). The Court compared these 
circumstances to a gunman firing a bullet into a 
sleeping figure when in fact the intended victim is 
already dead from natural causes. In this case, the 
Crown was able to prove the mens rea for the 
period after the accused became aware of his HIV 
status. After this time he continued to engage in 
sexual intercourse knowing that he was HIV 
positive. However, the Crown failed to prove 
endangerment at the time the accused was aware 
of his status. Since the accused “took more than 
preparatory steps”, the actus reus for attempt 
had been satisfied. The accused’s conviction for 
attempted aggravated assault and common 
nuisance was affirmed and the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
POLICE ACTING AS BOTH 
TRAFFIC WITNESS & 
PROSECUTOR CHALLENGED 
R. v. Cooper et al, 2003 BCCA 547 
 
Justice Hall of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal has 
granted leave to appeal in a case 
in which several persons are 
appealing their traffic 
convictions by arguing that it is unconstitutional 
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for a police officer to act as both a witness and 
the prosecutor at trial. The Supreme Court of 
British Columbia had earlier dismissed their 
appeal after ruling that the practice of the police 
acting as both a witness and the prosecutor, along 
with the applicable provisions of ss.64 and 65 of 
the Offence Act, had in some way violated the 
right to a fair trial protected under s.11(d) of the 
Charter, but was saved by s.1 (justifiability 
analysis). Stay tuned! 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SLOW DRIVING WARRANTS 
DETENTION 
R. v. Kalinowsky, 2003 SKQB 435 
 
The police stopped the accused 
after he was observed driving 
70km/h in a 100 km/h zone. 
While being asked for his licence 
and registration an officer 
detected an odour of alcohol and the roadside 
screening device demand was given. At trial in 
Saskatchewan Provinical Court the accused was 
convicted of impaired driving, but appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench arguing 
that he was arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the 
Charter even though the issue wasn’t raised at 
trial. The accused conceded that s.40(8) of 
Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act authorizes 
the police to stop vehicles associated with the 
lawful execution of their duties but submitted he 
could not be stopped because he was not in 
contravention of any rules of the road. In fact, he 
was driving slower than the posted speed limit. 
Nevertheless, Justice Pritchard ruled that the 
police were justified in stopping the vehicle: 
 
…I am satisfied that the officers had lawful 
authority to detain [the accused] as they did. 
They stopped him because he was travelling 30 
kilometers less than the posted speed limit. 
Even though travelling at this reduced rate of 
speed is not an offence, it implicitly gives rise 
to a concern about road safety. A driver 
operating a vehicle at such speed may be tired, 
ill, have night vision problems or simply be 
distracted. It is also possible that the vehicle 
may be encountering mechanical problems or 
the driver is overcompensating because his or 
her faculties are impaired by alcohol or drugs. 
Whatever the cause, public safety could be at 
risk. Indeed, if officers fail to investigate a 
vehicle when they notice it travelling 
significantly slower than normal on the 
highway, and if shortly thereafter the vehicle 
is involved in an accident, the officers might 
be seen as having been derelict in their duties. 
 
Travelling on a highway at 30 kilometers below 
the speed limit amounts to a substantial 
reduction in speed. I am satisfied that this 
noticeably reduced speed on the highway, 
particularly at night, was sufficient for the 
officers to have had a genuine concern for 
road safety. [para. 7-8] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
LOWERING SPEED BRACKET 
DISCRETIONARY 
R. v. Scott, 2003 NBQB 380 
 
Although the accused was 
charged and convicted with 
speeding 25 km/h or less over 
the speed limit contrary to 
s.140(1.1)(a) of New Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle 
Act, the police officer’s radar evidence was that 
he was travelling 28 km/h over the limit. The 
accused appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Queens Bench arguing, in part, that the police 
officer had no discretion in issuing a ticket for a 
speed lower than what he was actually travelling. 
However, Justice Turnbull disagreed stating: 
 
The police have considerable discretion in 
charging the lesser offence, which carries the 
lesser penalty. The gravamen of the offence is 
speeding. [The officer] testified he would not 
have given a ticket in this case if he himself 
had been driving over the speed limit. This is 
not dereliction of duty. It is all part of police 
discretion. [para. 6] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that in British Columbia pay 
toilets are illegal. Section 5 of 
the Public Toilet Act, a 
provincial statute, creates an 
offence for an owner, occupier, 
or person in control of a public 
place or building (such as a church, theatre, 
stadium, hospital, railway car, ferry, campsite, 
etc.) to have a toilet contained in a closet, 
receptacle, compartment, washroom, or restroom 
that is locked and requires the deposit of a coin 
or payment of money for its use.  
 
DNA WARRANT PASSES 
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER 
R. v. S.A.B., 2003 SCC 60 
 
After learning she was pregnant, 
the 14-year-old victim told her 
mother that the accused, who 
had been living with the family 
for several months, had sexually assaulted her. 
The victim had an abortion and the police seized 
the fetal tissue for DNA testing. The police 
obtained a DNA warrant under the provisions of 
the Criminal Code and subsequently seized a DNA 
sample from the accused to compare with the 
fetal tissue to determine whether he was the 
father. In effect, the procedure was a paternity 
test. The accused was arrested and charged with 
sexual assault and sexual exploitation. 
 
At his trial, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
justice found the DNA warrant provisions did not 
violate s.8 of the Charter (search and seizure). 
However, he did rule that the accused’s s.7 
Charter protection against self-incrimination was 
violated, but saved by s.1. As a result, the DNA 
evidence was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of the sexual assault only. On appeal to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal the majority found 
that neither s.8 nor s.7 of the Charter were 
violated.  The conviction was upheld.  
 
The accused launched a further appeal, this time 
to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the 
Criminal Code DNA warrant provisions violated 
the Charter including s.8 (search and seizure) and 
s.7 (principle against self-incrimination). In the 
unanimous nine member court judgment, the 
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal 
and ruled that the DNA warrant scheme properly 
balanced an individual’s rights with those of 
effective law enforcement.  
 
DNA warrants require a system of pre-search 
authorization issued only by a provincial court 
judge in cases were designated offences are 
committed. Furthermore, the degree in which the 
warrant interferes with bodily integrity is not 
particularly invasive and is relatively modest—
buccal swabs, skin prick, or plucking of hairs.  
Samples are only collected for a limited forensic 
purpose—comparing information to an existing 
sample and no information concerning medical, 
physical, or mental characteristics is revealed. In 
fact, misuse of information is explicitly 
prohibited under the DNA warrant scheme. In 
summary, Justice Arbour, writing for the court, 
held: 
 
I can therefore conclude that, in general 
terms, the DNA warrant provisions of the 
Criminal Code strike an appropriate balance 
between the public interest in effective 
criminal law enforcement for serious offences, 
and the rights of individuals to control the 
release of personal information about 
themselves, as well as their right to dignity 
and physical integrity. 
 
Now specifically dealing with the alleged breach 
of s.8 of the Charter, the accused argued that 
DNA warrants were unreasonable on the following 
three grounds: 
 
• The legislation is not minimally intrusive. In 
his view, DNA warrants should be an 
investigative last resort, similar to that used 
in wiretap authorizations; 
 
• The legislation operates only on reasonable 
grounds. It was submitted that a standard 
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higher than reasonable grounds should be 
adopted for searches and seizures that 
violate bodily integrity and force self-
conscription; and 
 
• The legislation always allows an ex parte 
application. 
 
Minimally Intrusive 
 
The accused argued that DNA warrants should be 
an investigative last resort, similar to that used in 
wiretap authorizations. The Court dismissed this 
ground of attack and stated: 
 
I see no reason to import, as a constitutional 
imperative, a similar requirement in the case 
of DNA warrants. There are obvious 
differences between the use of wiretaps as an 
investigative tool, and recourse to a DNA 
warrant. Wiretaps are sweeping in their reach. 
They invariably intrude into the privacy 
interests of third parties who are not 
targeted by the criminal investigation. They 
cast a net that is inevitably wide. By contrast, 
DNA warrants are target specific. 
Significantly, DNA warrants also have the 
capacity to exonerate an accused early in the 
investigative process. Although it would have 
been open to Parliament to provide for the use 
of forensic DNA analysis as a last resort 
investigative technique, I can see no reason to 
require, as a condition for constitutional 
compliance, that it be so. Moreover, as the 
Court of Appeal noted, the s. 487.05(1) 
requirement of showing that the warrant is "in 
the best interests of the administration of 
justice" would prevent a judge from issuing a 
warrant where it is unnecessary to do so. 
 
Reasonable Grounds 
 
Reasonable grounds is the ordinary constitutional 
standard for search warrants and the degree of 
intrusiveness in the proper execution of a DNA 
warrant compares favourably to strip searches. 
Strip searches, which are inherently humiliating 
and degrading, are valid if conducted on the basis 
of reasonable grounds. The Court found no reason 
to adopt a standard higher than reasonable 
grounds for DNA warrants.  
Ex Parte Applications 
 
DNA warrants may be obtained ex parte, which 
means only one party (police) need be present 
when the warrant is applied for. Although the 
DNA provisions allow for ex parte applications, 
they do not preclude a judge from having the 
other party present. The Court held:   
 
Requiring an inter partes hearing for a search 
warrant that is part of the investigative 
process could unnecessarily draw out and 
frustrate the criminal investigation. However, 
the majority of the Court of Appeal was 
correct to observe that the reference to ex 
parte proceedings is not mandatory. Indeed, s. 
487.05(1) does not deprive a judge of the 
option of requiring a contested hearing in a 
suitable case. An issuing judge may find it 
advisable to require notice in order to ensure 
reasonableness and fairness in the 
circumstances. But, as with most investigative 
techniques, the ex parte nature of the 
proceedings is constitutionally acceptable as a 
norm because of the risk that the suspect 
would take steps to frustrate the proper 
execution of the warrant. 
 
Principle Against Self Incrimination 
 
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument 
that the DNA warrants violated the principle 
against self-incrimination protected in s.7 of the 
Charter. Justice  Arbour ruled: 
 
The question, then, is whether the DNA 
warrant provisions at issue in this case 
impermissibly violate the principle against 
self-incrimination, thus rendering any search 
or seizure performed under them 
unreasonable, contrary to s. 8. In my view, a 
consideration of the principle's underlying 
rationales indicates that they do not. First, 
unlike cases involving testimonial compulsion, 
there is no concern with unreliability. On the 
contrary, one of the benefits of DNA evidence 
is its high degree of reliability. The second 
rationale -- protection against the abuse of 
power by the state -- requires a somewhat 
deeper analysis. ...the degree to which the 
principle is engaged will depend in part on the 
extent to which coercion was used by the 
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state in obtaining the statements; the extent 
to which the relationship between the accused 
and the state was adversarial at the time the 
conscriptive evidence was obtained; and the 
presence or absence of an increased risk of 
abuses of power by the state as a result of 
the compulsion....  
 
The adversarial nature of the relationship 
between the state and the individual and the 
degree of coercion in the present context are 
undoubtedly high. ... A person has little choice 
but to comply with the request for blood, hair 
or saliva made under a valid DNA search 
warrant. Further, the context in which the 
bodily samples are taken is obviously 
adversarial, there being reasonable grounds to 
believe that the target of the warrant was a 
party to an offence. However, while these 
factors are highly engaged, it is important to 
note that under the DNA warrant provisions, 
there are a number of safeguards in place to 
prevent abuse of those provisions by the 
state. In particular, the prior judicial 
authorization, circumscribed by strict 
requirements of reasonable and probable 
grounds and stringent limits on the potential 
use of the collected DNA evidence, ensures 
that the power to obtain bodily samples is not 
abused. It is also important to acknowledge 
that, as previously noted, the degree of 
intrusion both physical and informational is 
limited. 
 
In sum, a consideration of the rationales 
underlying the principle against self-
incrimination suggests that this is one of those 
cases...where "the factors that favour the 
importance of the search for truth . . . 
outweigh the factors that favour protecting 
the individual against undue compulsion by the 
state". 
 
To conclude, the legislative scheme delineated 
in ss. 487.04 to 487.09 is sensitive to the 
various interests at play. On balance, the law 
provides for a search and seizure of DNA 
materials that is reasonable. In light of the 
high probative value of forensic DNA analysis, 
the interests of the state override those of 
the individual. Forensic DNA analysis is 
capable of both identifying and eliminating 
suspects, a feature that seriously reduces the 
risk of wrongful convictions. The DNA 
provisions contain procedural safeguards that 
protect adequately the multiple interests of 
the suspected offender. The DNA warrant 
scheme therefore complies with s. 8 of the 
Charter. I turn now to the final issue, the 
expert's evidence. [paras.58-61, references 
omitted] 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
TOP COURT EXAMINES 
CIVILIAN ARREST 
R. v. Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada 
recently examined the use of 
force in the context of a civilian 
arrest. In this case, an airport 
security inspector effected the arrest of a taxi 
driver under s.9 of Ontario’s Trespass to 
Property Act (TPA). He was scooping fares 
without a permit at Toronto’s Pearson 
International Airport. The accused’s unattended 
vehicle was observed parked at the curb and 
inspectors watched him emerge from the 
terminal. The accused was touched on the 
shoulder, told he was under arrest for 
trespassing, and informed he would be detained 
for police arrival. He tried to enter his vehicle 
but an inspector blocked his way. The accused 
then shoved his car door into the inspector, 
forcing him to back off. The accused entered his 
vehicle and drove away. He was subsequently 
charged with assault with intent to resist arrest 
and escaping lawful custody. 
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
trial judge concluded that the inspector was 
entitled to arrest the accused but was not 
entitled to use force to effect the arrest 
because s.9 of the TPA did not permit it. Nor 
should such authority be inferred from the 
common law for provincial misdemeanors, said the 
judge. Furthermore, the judge held that citizens, 
arrestees, or both could be injured unnecessarily 
if such authority were read into the Act, thereby 
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making bad public policy. Since the use of force 
was not authorized, “the accused was entitled to 
resist an unlawful use of force designed to 
continue and preserve [his lawful] arrest and 
custody”. The charge of assault with intent to 
resist arrest was dismissed, but the accused was 
convicted of escape lawful custody for this 
incident and a second similar incident that 
occurred three days earlier.  
 
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal against the escape lawful custody 
convictions was dismissed. However, it allowed 
the Crown’s appeal against the dismissal of the 
assault with intent to resist arrest charge. In the 
Court of Appeal’s view, the TPA did include the 
authority to use reasonable force in effecting an 
arrest. The acquittal for the assault with intent 
to resist arrest charge was set aside and a 
conviction was entered. The accused appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
In a 9:0 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
dismissed the appeal. Section 9 of Ontario’s TPA 
does not set out the procedure for arrest. It 
reads: 
 
s.9 Trespass to Property Act 
(1) A police officer, or the occupier of premises, or a 
person authorized by the occupier may arrest without 
warrant any person he or she believes of reasonable 
and probable grounds to be on the premises in 
contravention of section 2. 
(2) Where the person who makes the arrest under 
subsection (1) is not a police officer, he or she shall 
promptly call for the assistance of a police officer and 
give the person arrested into the custody of the police 
officer. 
(3) A police officer to whom the custody of a person is 
given under subsection (2) shall be deemed to have 
arrested the person for the purposes of the provisions 
of the Provincial Offences Act applying to his or her 
release or continued detention and bail. 
 
The Ontario legislature has used the term 
“arrest” in s.9 of the TPA as a term of art.  The 
common law definition of arrest, a “well-
understood legal procedure”, is therefore 
incorporated into the Act, unless otherwise 
modified expressly or by necessary implication. 
At common law, an arrest is effected in two ways: 
 
• actual seizure or touching of a person’s body 
with a view to detention; or 
 
• words of arrest followed by submission to the 
process. 
 
“Arrest implies confrontation and confrontation 
creates a potential for the use of force by one 
party or the other”, said the Court. In this case, 
something more than just mere touching or words 
of arrest were required to secure the accused’s 
compliance. Moreover, “the right to use 
reasonable force attaches at common law to the 
institution of an arrest” and it is “the ability to 
use force [that] often provides the necessary 
precondition to [secure] the submission of the 
person arrested.” Thus, something more than 
simply touching the accused or telling him he was 
under arrest was authorized in this case.  
 
However, the Court noted that many trespasses 
are trivial and are best handled my means short 
of an arrest, thereby avoiding possible 
prosecutions against the arrestor for assault and 
civil claims for false arrest or excessive force. 
Also, the Court cautioned that the same latitude 
permitted to police officers who are under a duty 
to act in often difficult and exigent 
circumstances may not necessarily be shown to an 
occupier who is under no duty to act and 
instigates the confrontation with the trespasser. 
In summary, the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded: 
 
In my view, “arrest” in the context of the 
[Trespass to Property Act] should be seen as a 
continuing status initiated by words 
accompanied by physical touching or 
submission and ending with delivery to the 
police, maintained as necessary with force 
that is no more than reasonable in all the 
circumstances. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
 
 
 Volume 3 Issue 6 
November/December 2003 
46
‘DIAL A DOPE’ CELL PHONE 
CALLS ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Nguyen & Bui, 2003 BCCA 556 
 
While speaking to a 
prostitute/drug user, two 
plainclothes police officers 
observed a “drug car” drive by 
their location. As they pulled the car over, a black 
object was observed thrown from the passenger 
window. The object was retrieved and found to be 
a small plastic film canister containing cocaine and 
heroin. As they approached the vehicle, police 
noted the passenger fidgeting with something in 
the pocket of the passenger door; a cell phone 
was seized from this location. A second cell phone 
was seized from the vehicle between the 
occupants while a third phone was seized from 
the driver’s belt. Both accused were arrested. 
 
One of the officers received four phone calls 
from the phone found in the passenger door 
pocket. One call was a hang up and the other 
three calls were orders for drugs. At the police 
station, another phone call ordering drugs was 
received and the voice was believed to be that of 
the prostitute/drug addict police were earlier 
speaking to. After receiving a call on the driver’s 
cell phone ordering drugs, police agreed to meet 
the caller. A meet was made and a woman arrived 
at the location with $30.  
 
At the accused’s trial, the cellular phone calls 
were admitted into evidence. Also, an expert 
witness testified that the accused were involved 
in a “dial a dope” operation and were in possession 
of drugs for the purpose of trafficking. Both 
accused were convicted of possession of cocaine 
and possession of heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking. However, they appealed their 
convictions to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred 
in admitting the cellular telephone conversations 
because they were inadmissible hearsay. 
 
British Columbia’s top court dismissed the appeal. 
In ruling that the cell phone calls were not 
hearsay and could be admitted into evidence, 
Justice McKenzie stated: 
 
In my view, the conclusion that these 
telephone conversations are not hearsay rests 
on the circumstantial guarantee their 
trustworthiness and therefore meets the 
requirements of necessity and reliability of 
the evidence which, of course, is also the basis 
for the principal exception to the hearsay rule 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the R. v. Khan, [1990] 25 S.C.R. 531.  
 
It follows that in my view the evidence of the 
telephone calls was properly admitted and I 
would reject that ground of appeal. [para. 17-
18] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
RCMP MUST DISCLOSE 
INFORMATION ABOUT POLICE 
MEMBERS 
Information Commissioner of Canada v. 
Commissioner of the RCMP,  
2003 SCC 8 
 
A person had requested 
information in connection with 
litigation against a number of 
RCMP officers. The RCMP 
refused to disclose the records on the basis that 
it was personal information as defined in Canada’s 
Privacy Act. A complaint was made to Canada’s 
Information Commissioner who investigated the 
matter. The RCMP agreed to release only the 
current postings and positions of the active 
members and the last posting and position of one 
retired member, but no more. The Information 
Commissioner found that other job related 
information was not personal information and he 
ordered the records be disclosed. The RCMP 
refused and the Information Commissioner took 
them to Federal Court. The trial judge ruled that 
only current positions of active members and the 
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last position of former employees be released. 
This decision was upheld by the Federal Court of 
Appeal. However, on appeal to the  Supreme Court 
of Canada, in a 9-0 judgment, Canada’s highest 
Court ordered that the RCMP Commissioner 
disclose the additional information about the 
RCMP officers. In ordering the disclosure of the 
requested information, Justice Gonthier held: 
 
In my opinion, (1) the list of the RCMP members’ 
historical postings, their status and date; (2) 
the list of ranks, and the dates they achieved 
those ranks; (3) their years of service; and (4) 
their anniversary dates of service, are all 
elements that relate to the general 
characteristics associated with the position or 
functions of an RCMP member. They do not 
reveal anything about their competence or 
divulge any personal opinion given outside the 
course of employment – rather, they provide 
information relevant to understanding the 
functions they perform. Put another way, the 
aspects of employment described above shed 
light on the general attributes of the position 
and functions of an RCMP member. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
DISCLOSURE NOT 
ABSOLUTE: RESTRICTING 
VIDEO VIEWING PROPER 
R. v . Papageorgiou, 
(2003) Docket:C39011 (OntCA) 
 
The accused sought a copy of 
the videotaped statement of 
a sexual assault victim. He 
had earlier viewed the video 
with his lawyer at his lawyer’s 
office. However, his lawyer had since been 
discharged and the video statement was 
returned to Crown. The Crown agreed to allow 
the accused to view the tape at the Crown’s 
office, but would not give him a copy of the 
tape due to its sensitive nature. The accused 
was convicted of sexual assault at trial but was 
successful on appeal. The Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice held that the accused’s 
access to the tape was too restrictive and a 
stay of proceedings was entered. The Crown 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.    
 
Although the Crown has a legal duty to disclose 
all relevant information to the defence, that 
duty is not absolute. Unless there is privilege 
attached to the information, the Crown must 
not withhold information in which there would 
be a reasonable possibility that non-disclosure 
would impair the right of an accused to make 
full answer and defence. However, the Crown 
may exercise some discretion in withholding 
information and the manner and timing of 
disclosure.  
 
In this case, it was the form of further 
disclosure that was the issue. The Crown had 
disclosed the video, which was reviewed by the 
accused and his previous lawyer. But in 
sensitive cases involving sexual abuse, “the 
Crown’s disclosure obligations are satisfied, 
and the public interest is fostered, by 
providing the self-represented accused with an 
opportunity to view the videotaped statement 
of the complainant at the Crown’s office.”  
Justice Weiler, for the unanimous court, 
stated: 
 
In our view, therefore, there was no breach of 
the Crown’s disclosure obligations in this case 
concerning the complainant’s videotaped 
statement. The statement had already been 
disclosed and, when the [accused] became self 
represented, the proposed additional access to 
the videotape was in conformity with the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee’s 
Report. The position of the Crown was 
reasonable in the absence of any evidence of 
prejudice to the respondent. [para. 14] 
 
The stay of proceedings was set aside, the 
conviction restored, and the matter was sent back 
to the lower appeal court for further disposition. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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ARRESTEE NEED ONLY 
UNDERSTAND GENERAL 
EXTENT OF JEOPARDY 
R. v. Ekman, 2003 BCCA 485 
 
The accused was arrested by 
police for murder and was given 
his Charter warning. He 
subsequently provided a 
statement to police which was admitted as 
evidence and he was convicted of attempted 
murder by a jury. The Crown appealed the 
attempt murder verdict arguing a new trial should 
be ordered on a first degree murder charge, 
while the accused submitted his conviction should 
be set aside. As part of his appeal to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, the accused contended 
that the police violated his s.10(a) Charter right 
in that they did not properly inform him of the 
reasons for his arrest. Although the accused 
conceded that the police are not required to be 
precise about the potential charge and are only 
required to advise an arrestee of the general 
nature of their arrest, he submitted that the 
police knew this was first degree murder and 
should have informed him as such. In his view, 
since the first degree murder charge has a 
different parole eligibility period than second 
degree murder, the police were required to tell 
him that he was being investigated for the most 
serious offence and that he could again consult 
with a lawyer.  
 
In writing the judgment for the unanimous court, 
Justice Thackray concluded that, even though the 
police challenged the accused in the interview 
that the killing was planned and deliberate, the 
officer did not necessarily know what the 
ultimate charge facing the accused would be. 
Moreover, s.10(a) requires the police to advise an 
individual of the reason for their arrest so they 
can generally understand the extent of their 
jeopardy and thereby exercise their right to 
counsel under s.10(b) in a meaningful way.  In this 
case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed 
with the trial judge when she stated: 
 
In this case [the accused] knew from the time 
of his arrest that he was facing a charge of 
murder. Whether the charge is first degree or 
second degree murder, the sentence of life 
imprisonment under the Criminal Code is the 
same. [The accused] generally understood the 
extent of his jeopardy. I conclude there has 
been no violation of [the accused’s] s.10(a) 
rights. 
 
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed, but the Crown’s appeal, based on other 
arguments, was allowed. A new trial on the charge 
of first degree murder was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
  
BREACH OF THE PEACE ARREST 
LAWFUL 
R. v. Chasse, 2003 BCPC 101 
 
Two police officers attended a 
residence to investigate a 
complaint of a domestic dispute 
in progress. On arrival, a female 
occupant of the home told them 
that she had earlier had a verbal altercation with 
the accused and that she had left the premises. 
She said that they both lived at the home and 
that earlier in the evening she became upset with 
the accused and threw some of his property onto 
the front lawn. There was no evidence of an 
assault and the police left.  
 
Less than an hour later, the police received a call 
back. It was reported that the accused had 
returned to the home. This time, the police could 
hear a loud male voice yelling and swearing from 
inside the home. An officer knocked on the door 
and was asked what he wanted. He knocked again 
and the accused rapidly opened the door and 
stood in an aggressive posture with his fists 
balled up and arms at his sides, but away from his 
body. The officer caught a glimpse of the female 
down the hallway but she then disappeared out of 
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sight. The accused continued to be loud, angry 
and profane. Another officer attempted to enter 
the home to check on the welfare of the female, 
but the accused blocked the officer’s entry. 
Fearing he had to control the situation, one of 
the officers arrested the accused for breach of 
the peace under s.31 of the Criminal Code. A 
struggle ensued and when the officer stepped 
back he injured his knee and lost his balance, 
grabbing onto the accused. The struggle 
continued and the officer was struck in the head. 
The accused was subsequently restrained 
following the deployment of the police baton and 
other defensive tactics. 
 
The accused was charged with two counts of 
obstructing a peace officer and one count of 
assaulting a peace officer. These charges require 
proof that the officer was engaged in the 
execution of his duty. If an officer exceeds their 
powers, they do not meet this requirement. At his 
trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued the arrest was unlawful and 
therefore the police were not properly engaged in 
their duty. However, considering the definition of 
a breach of the peace, the judge concluded that 
the police believed on reasonable grounds that 
the accused was committing or was about to 
commit a breach of the peace. Justice Skilnick 
held: 
 
In summary, the existence of an apparent 
breach of the peace was made out by the loud, 
profane, angry and abusive behaviour of the 
Accused in circumstances where it was 
reasonable for the police officers to believe 
that harm might come to [the female]. 
 
The arrest was lawful and therefore the police 
officers were acting in the execution of their 
duties. The accused was convicted. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Once the game is over, the king and the pawn go 
back in the same box—Italian proverb 
ALCOHOL ODOUR JUSTIFIES 
ROADSIDE DEMAND 
R. v. Tucker, 2003 MBPC 10027 
 
The police were conducting 
routine Checkstop enforcement 
on a busy street near several 
bars and lounges when the 
accused was stopped driving. The 
accused had an odour of liquor on his breath, he 
admitted to consuming three beers, and said his 
last drink was 15 minutes earlier. There was 
nothing improper about his driving and the 
accused did not display any signs of impairment. 
The officer made a roadside screening device 
demand and the accused failed. A breathalyzer 
demand was subsequently made and readings of 
100mg% and 90mg% were obtained. The accused 
was charged with impaired driving and over 
80mg%. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the 
accused submitted that the officer had no 
grounds to demand a roadside sample because 
there were no signs of impairment. In rejecting 
this argument, Justice Sandhu stated: 
 
Having reasonable suspicion that the driver of a 
motor vehicle has alcohol in their body is 
sufficient to trigger the demand. Two police 
officers testifying as to alcohol on the breath 
of [the accused] constitutes a sufficient basis 
of fact to justify the demand.  
 
However, the accused was acquitted of the over 
80mg% and impaired driving on other grounds. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
  
NON-RECORDED CONFESSION 
SUSPECT 
R. v. White,  
(2003) Docket:C3509 (OntCA) 
 
The accused’s car was boxed in 
by police and he was arrested on 
four outstanding bank robberies. 
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His wife, who was with him, was also arrested as 
an accessory after the fact. He saw her 
handcuffed and taken away in a police car. A 
detective searched the accused and testified he 
found several syringes, including used ones, in his 
socks and back pocket, but no record was made of 
this discovery nor did police keep them. At the 
time of his arrest the police testified the 
accused made some statements. 
 
During the transport to the police station the 
detectives initiated conversation with the 
accused about his heroin addiction. The 
detectives then collaborated on their notes at 
the station. At the police station the accused was 
paraded before the desk sergeant and then taken 
to an interview room where his handcuffs were 
removed. He was strip searched and asked about 
the robberies; he was told police had photos of 
the robbery suspect who appeared to be him (but 
in fact the photographs did not identify anyone 
because the suspect was wearing sunglasses, a 
baseball cap, and in one photo a wig). The accused 
stated “I guess I’m done again. I don’t know why 
people rat on me. I never hurt anybody.”  No 
contemporaneous notes of these statements were 
made. 
 
After the strip search a detective, who was alone 
with the accused in the interview room, testified 
he confessed to the four robberies, identified 
himself in the surveillance photographs, and 
agreed to provide an audio recorded statement. 
These admissions were not recorded on tape, 
rather the detective wrote the questions and 
answers in his notebook. An audio taped 
confession was subsequently recorded by police. 
The accused’s wife, whom police had no knowledge 
of her involvement, was released shortly after 
the taped confession was taken.  
 
During the trial voir dire the accused denied 
committing the robberies, denied making 
incriminating statements during the strip search, 
and testified that the police told him that if he 
did not confess his wife would go down with him, 
her name would be publicized in the newspapers, 
she would lose her job, and Children’s Aid would 
take her child.  
 
Even though the detectives admitted at trial that 
they set out to interrogate the accused without 
recording equipment, the judge found the 
statements voluntary and that there were no 
inducements made. The accused was convicted of 
bank robbery x4 and wearing a disguise. The 
accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that his statements should have 
been ruled involuntary and were thus inadmissible.  
 
Justice Feldman, writing for the unanimous court, 
agreed. The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
previously ruled that statements will be 
inherently suspect when recording facilities are 
available but the police intentionally don’t use 
them (R. v. Moore-MacFarlane (2001) 
Docket:C31374/C30881 (OntCA)). To overcome 
this suspicion when a recording is not made, a 
trial judge will need to determine, by carefully 
scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the 
taking of the statement, whether the Crown has 
nonetheless proven voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Court stated: 
 
In my view, this is a case where the 
voluntariness of the [accused’s] statements is 
suspect. This is because the police set out 
twice to interrogate the [accused] without 
using the available recording equipment, and 
because there is nothing in the evidence on 
the voir dire which could satisfy the court of 
the reliability of the account of the officers. 
In those circumstances, the statements during 
the strip search and the recorded confession 
following the unrecorded interview with [the 
detective] should not have been admitted. 
[para. 25] 
 
The appeal was allowed and the convictions were 
set aside. A new trial was ordered only on one 
charge. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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OFFICER’s DISDAIN FOR 
CHARTER AMOUNTS TO BAD 
FAITH  
R. v. Lam, 2003 BCCA 593 
 
While patrolling a light industrial 
area at 8:30 pm a police officer 
queried the licence number of a 
van parked in a cul-de-sac and 
learned the owner was flagged “Caution Violence” 
and was awaiting disposition on an outstanding 
drug matter. The officer noted two people 
peering over the dash, parked behind the van and 
walked to the driver’s side, observing three large 
black duffle bags in the back of the van. The 
accused produced a valid driver’s licence but 
could not produce the registration, stating it was 
at home. The officer asked the accused what was 
in the bags and he replied it was his clothing. 
When asked to show the clothing, the accused 
took the key from the ignition, unlocked and 
opened the rear door, and then stood back.  
 
The officer then asked to be shown the clothing. 
The accused, who was somewhat hesitant, moved 
to the closest bag and slowly unzipped it about 12 
inches, then stopped. Since he could not see in 
the bag, the officer again asked the accused to 
open it. The accused reached in the bag and lifted 
some green plastic bagging.  Back up officers 
arrived and the officer once again asked the 
accused to show him the clothing. The accused 
pulled out the green baggy, revealing some clear 
plastic bags containing marihuana. The accused 
and his passenger were arrested for possession 
for the purpose of trafficking. A search warrant 
was applied for, but refused.  The following day a 
second search warrant was applied for and 
granted. Police subsequently found 108 lbs. of 
marihuana. 
 
At his trial in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia the officer testified he had many 
experiences dealing with marihuana wrapped in 
similar circumstances, but also conceded they 
resembled bags that ERT gear is carried in. He 
also testified that if he did not get the accused’s 
consent he would seize the bags anyway and make 
a “no case seizure”, leaving it to the accused to 
pursue a civil remedy. The judge concluded that 
the police had an articulable cause to question and 
detain the accused. Under the circumstances, the 
officer was conducting a spontaneous 
investigation and was entitled to ask the accused 
to open the bags to secure his safety. The search 
was justified and did not violate the accused’s s.8 
Charter right. Even if there was a breach, the 
trial judge said it was minimal and he would have 
nonetheless admitted the evidence under s.24(2) 
of the Charter. The accused appealed his 
conviction to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. 
 
The appeal court justices unanimously agreed that 
the search incidental to this investigative 
detention was not undertaken with officer safety 
in mind, thus making it unlawful. Justice Esson, to 
which the majority agreed, stated: 
 
There were, as the trial judge found, 
circumstances faced by [the officer] which 
could be said to have entitled him to “secure 
his safety”.  But I see no reasonable basis in 
his evidence for holding that, in searching the 
bags in the way he did, he was motivated by a 
concern about weapons or by a concern to 
“secure his safety”.  He gave no evidence of 
having such a motive and indeed he was frank 
to say that his motive was to obtain evidence 
of an offence.  More to the point, the manner 
of the search, i.e., persuading the suspect to 
open the rear door of the van and open the 
bags, is not a course consistent with a concern 
to secure one’s safety. [para. 10] 
 
Having found a breach of the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights, the appeal court was, however, 
divided on the issue of s.24(2) admissibility. The 
majority concluded that the admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute because of the officer’s bad faith. 
First, “a “no-case seizure” is an extra legal 
concept that flies in the face of the Charter and 
cannot be condoned.”  Secondly, the officer’s 
testimony reflected “a disdain for the Charter.” 
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He described the law on consent as a “bowl of 
Jell-O”, even though the rules for consent were 
clearly laid down in 1994 by the Supreme Court of 
Canada10. Fatal to this case was that the officer 
failed to inform the accused he did not have to 
open the bag if he did not want to.  
 
In dissent, Justice Esson agreed with the trial 
judge that the evidence should not be excluded 
under s.24(2). He concluded that the reduced 
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle, the 
non-conscriptive characteristic of the evidence, 
and the minimal nature of the breach did not 
warrant its exclusion. The majority allowed the 
appeal, excluded the evidence, and entered a 
verdict of not guilty.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca  
 
SEARCH OF GLOVEBOX & 
TRUNK INCIDENTAL TO 
ARREST 
R. v. Carlston, 2003 SKCA 106 
 
A police officer, who was aware 
of an earlier break and enter at 
a business where a cash register 
drawer had been stolen, saw the 
accused’s vehicle fail to stop at a 
stop sign. After activating the emergency lights, 
the vehicle accelerated to about 70 km/h in a 50 
km/h zone and took what the police considered 
“evasive action”. After stopping the vehicle the 
accused (driver) was unable to produce his 
driver’s licence or registration. The officer shone 
his flashlight into the vehicle and saw two 
passengers and numerous items of property 
including a cash register drawer and several 
bottles of champagne. The accused was asked to 
exit the vehicle and it was noted he was wearing a 
jacket associated to an organized street gang. He 
did however, deny ownership of the cash drawer 
and champagne. Nevertheless, the officer 
arrested the accused for possession of stolen 
property.  
                                                 
10 R. v. Borden [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 
The officer was aware of the accused’s prior 
criminal record and, along with the jacket and 
presence of two male passengers, was concerned 
with his safety. The vehicle was searched without 
a warrant and the police found stolen property in 
the glove box and trunk that subsequently led to 
searches of other premises around the city and 
many more charges. The accused was ultimately 
charged with 29 criminal counts involving break 
and enter and theft. 
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court, the 
evidence resulting from the vehicle and other 
searches was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of 22 counts. He appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that his s.8 Charter right protecting him against 
unreasonable search and seizure was violated as a 
result of the search of his vehicle and that the 
evidence flowing from this search should have 
been excluded. The Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal. Justice 
Jackson, writing for the unanimous court, found 
the use of the flashlight in the manner used by 
the police was a justified “plain view search”. The 
arrest was proper and “[t]he vehicle searches 
flowed reasonably and properly from [the 
officer’s] conclusion to arrest [the accused] as an 
incident of arrest and his fears regarding officer 
safety.”  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
FAIL READING SUPPORTS 
GROUNDS FOR BREATH 
DEMAND 
R. v. Braun, 2003 ABQB 273 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused at a Checkstop and 
detected an odour of alcohol 
from him and noted that his eyes 
were red and glassy. The accused admitted to 
having one rye and coke.  The officer formed the 
suspicion the accused had consumed alcohol and 
made a roadside screening demand. A fail reading 
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resulted and the officer formed the opinion the 
accused was impaired by alcohol, arrested him, 
informed him of his Charter rights, and read the 
breathalyzer demand. Breath samples were 
subsequently obtained and the accused was 
charged with impaired driving and over 80mg%.  
 
At his trial in Alberta Provincial Court the 
charges were dismissed after the judge refused 
to admit the breath certificates of analysis on 
the basis the police violated s.8 of the Charter. 
In his view, there were no other symptoms of 
impairment other than the fail reading and the 
officer did not testify as to the relationship 
between the roadside failure and his belief that 
the accused was impaired or over 80mg%. Thus, 
he did not have reasonable and probable grounds 
on which to base the breathalyzer demand. The 
Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred 
in finding a s.8 breach.  
 
Justice Mahoney agreed with the Crown. He first 
outlined a number of principles regarding the use 
of the roadside screening device (RSD)11. 
 
• A breathalyzer demand requires reasonable 
and probable grounds that a person has 
committed an offence under s.253 of the 
Criminal Code;  
 
• An RSD may be administered on a reasonable 
suspicion of alcohol in the body; 
 
• A properly conducted test resulting in a fail 
reading will normally be enough for a 
breathalyzer demand (reasonable and 
probable grounds); 
 
• A fail reading may also be considered with 
other symptoms of impairment to furnish 
reasonable and probable grounds; 
 
• If the police officer suspects the RSD will 
not provide accurate results (eg. subject 
drinking within last 15 minutes) then the 
results will not furnish reasonable and 
                                                 
11 These principles were taken from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. 
Bernshaw, (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) 
probable grounds unless the officer waits 
until they feel the test results will be 
accurate;   
 
• The police officer is under no obligation to 
make inquiries from the subject if there are 
circumstances that would provide inaccurate 
results on the RSD; and 
 
• A police officer is entitled to disbelieve a 
person who says there may be circumstances 
that would produce an inaccurate reading (eg. 
alcohol consumed shortly before driving) and 
immediately require a roadside test. 
 
Aside from the fail reading, there were other 
indicia of impairment. The accused had an odour 
of alcohol, his eyes were glassy and red, and he 
admitted he had one drink. This lead to the 
roadside demand which resulted in a fail reading, 
subsequently leading to the officer’s opinion the 
accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired. This conclusion was sufficient to explain 
what the fail reading meant to the officer. 
Justice Mahoney stated: 
 
…the officer had other symptoms of 
impairment upon which he 
could very properly have based his conclusion 
that he had reasonable and probable ground 
for making the demand. The officer wished to 
have his suspicions confirmed by the Alco-Sur 
test. After the test the officer now has, the 
smell of alcohol, red and glassy eyes, an 
admission by the Respondent of alcohol 
consumption and a “red fail.” This…is enough 
reasonable and probable grounds to make a 
demand. In fact…a “fail” result on a properly 
conducted authorized roadside screening test 
alone will normally be sufficient grounds to 
furnish the officer with reasonable and 
probable grounds to demand a breath sample. 
[para. 15, references omitted] 
 
The trial judge was in error and the Crown appeal 
was allowed. A new trial was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
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SEARCH OF PERSON IN 
PREMISE REQUIRES MORE 
THAN MERE PRESENCE 
R. v. Phan, 2003 ABQB 469 
 
Several police officers executed 
a drug search warrant on a 
residence by breaching both the 
front and rear doors with steel 
battering rams. Two occupants, the accused and a 
female, were located in the kitchen of the house 
and were advised they were being detained (not 
arrested) under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA). They were told to lie on 
their stomachs and were handcuffed. The 
accused was pat frisked in the areas accessible to 
his hands for officer safety and his pant pockets 
were searched. Police found several small baggies 
of cocaine. The accused was charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
under s.4(1) of the CDSA.  
 
During his trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench, a voir dire was held to determine the 
admissibility of the evidence. The accused argued 
that his Charter rights under s.9 (arbitrary 
detention), s.8 (search and seizure), and s.7 
(liberty) were breached because the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to search him as 
required by s.11(5) of the CDSA. A police officer 
testified that they could search anyone found in a 
residence being searched under s.11(1) of the 
CDSA. This, he said, included strip searches and 
need not be restricted to officer safety. Section 
11(5) of the CDSA reads: 
 
s.11(5) Controlled Drugs and Substances Act  
Where a peace officer who executes a warrant issued 
under subsection ( 1) has reasonable grounds to believe 
that any person found in the place set out in the 
warrant has in their person any controlled substance, 
precursor, property or thing set out in the warrant, the 
peace officer may search the person for the controlled 
substance, precursor, property or thing and seize it. 
 
This section does not confer the authority to 
search anyone found in a residence being 
searched pursuant to a warrant, but in fact 
requires that the police have an independent 
belief based on reasonable grounds that the 
person found in the premises has the drug on 
them. 
 
The Detention 
 
Queen’s Bench Justice Johnstone first examined 
the detention and found it justified and lawful 
under the circumstances; thus no s.9 breach was 
made out. The judge stated: 
 
Under the doctrine of investigative detention, 
the police are entitled to detain individuals 
even where there are insufficient grounds for 
arrest provided at a minimum there be an 
articulable cause, the functional equivalent of 
“reasonable suspicion” or “reasonable cause to 
suspect”. 
 
It is clear that the objective standard is the 
minimum standard to which the police are held. 
This prevents the exercise of power in a 
capricious or arbitrary manner. Applying this 
objective standard to the facts in the case at 
bar leads me to the conclusion that there was 
a constellation of objectively discernable facts 
which gave rise to reasonable suspicion, and 
consequently, the officers had the authority 
to detain the Accused. The most compelling of 
these facts was that the Accused was found in 
a well known drug house. The search of the 
residence revealed a notebook with 
mathematical entries. The officers had the 
authority to detain the Accused in order to 
investigate their suspicions that an offence 
may have occurred. [paras. 17-18, references 
omitted] 
 
The Search 
 
A search may or may not be reasonable following 
an investigative detention. In some cases, a 
minimal search incidental to lawful detention, 
unusually consisting of a pat down or frisk, may be 
reasonable provided the search is to ensure 
officer safety. However, s.11(5) of the CDSA 
does not confer the authority for the police to 
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search anyone found in a residence that is the 
target of a search warrant. In finding a serious 
breach of the accused’s Charter rights, Justice 
Johnstone held: 
 
There exist two competing values in this case. 
The first is the fact that police work is by its 
very nature dangerous and that ensuring the 
safety of police officers is a paramount 
consideration. The police in executing a search 
warrant do not know what will confront them 
when they enter, including the potential of 
occupants with weapons. On the other hand, an 
individual has the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. There is a 
temptation for authorities to sometime use 
such a search as an opportunity to obtain 
evidence of a crime. This is a temptation that is 
strongly resisted by the Courts.  
 
Individuals may be detained for investigative 
purposes and a cursory search such as a frisk or 
pat down as an incident to detention can be 
conducted to ensure officers’ safety. 
 
I also recognize that the police must seek to 
collect evidence. I have already referenced s. 
11(5) of the Act which gives police the 
statutory authority to search persons found in 
premises without arresting them, if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that such persons 
have controlled substances on their person. 
 
It appears that the officers, although acting in 
good faith, were operating under a standard 
belief that anyone found within the searched 
premises could be searched. The search 
warrant itself became their reasonable and 
probable grounds for effecting such searches 
of the person of the occupants. However, it was 
insufficient to do so. Therefore, this faulty 
reasoning resulted in a serious Charter breach 
given the nature of the search. ... A standard 
operating police practice of automatically 
searching all those found within searched 
premises, without more, will inevitably result in 
the systemic violation of Charter rights. [paras. 
24-27] 
 
 
 
 
Exclusion of Evidence 
 
Having found a breach of the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights, the Queen’s Bench court 
considered whether the admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. In excluding the evidence under 
s.24(2) of the Charter Justice Johnstone 
concluded: 
 
Although, as I had earlier indicated, the police 
officers were operating in good faith, there 
was no evidence adduced in the voir dire which 
would satisfy me that the peace officers 
believed that such reasonable and probable 
grounds existed; they simply relied on the 
warrant without more. The power to search 
someone found on the premises that were the 
subject of a search warrant imported a 
requirement pursuant to s. 11(5) that the 
officers have a reasonable belief that the 
person was in possession of a narcotic. The 
narcotics found were real evidence, but they 
could not have been discovered without the 
violation of Accused’s rights. This was a 
serious violation and not an isolated, situation-
driven incident. It indicates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the law by the officers 
and perhaps a systemic problem given their 
reference to “standard” practice. [para. 29] 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
VOIR DIRE APPLICATION 
REJECTED IN FLIR CASE 
R. v. Lewis,  
(2003) Docket:42062-3 (BCSC) 
 
The police obtained a forward 
looking infrared (FLIR) reading, 
which is capable of detecting 
heat radiating from a building, 
when they flew a helicopter in the public airspace 
near or above a barn. The accused sought to 
enter into a voir dire concerning the admissibility 
of the evidence of the FLIR, but was denied by 
British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Grist. 
The judge ruled that he was bound by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal decision (R. v. Hutchings 
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(1996), 111 C.C.C. 3d 215 (B.C.C.A.)) that held 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding the escape of heat from a barn because 
no private, personal, or core biographical 
information is at risk or obtained by the FLIR.  
 
COP DESERVES JAIL FOR 
CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST 
CONVICTION 
R. v. LeBlanc, 2003 NBCA 75 
 
The accused, an on-duty 23-year 
veteran police officer, 
responded to a residential fire in 
progress. He rummaged through 
the owner’s effects and stole various items, 
including $83 destined for children’s Christmas 
gifts. The owner was a single mother of modest 
means. During the investigation the accused 
falsely implicated members of the fire 
department in the theft. Ultimately, the accused 
was charged with theft under $5,000 and breach 
of trust under the Criminal Code, both proceeded 
by indictment. A preliminary hearing was held and 
he was ordered to stand trial. The accused 
eventually pled guilty to the breach of trust 
charge and Crown stayed the theft. In the 
meantime, between his committal to stand trial 
and his plea, the accused retired from the police 
department and received full pension benefits.  
 
At his sentencing hearing, the accused was given 
a conditional discharge under s.730(1) of the 
Criminal Code. He was placed on probation with 
conditions, including restitution, community 
service, and making a charitable donation in the 
sum of $1000. The Crown appealed to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing that the 
sentence was unfit. It submitted that the 
sentence imposed was contrary to the public 
interest, it was disproportionate to the gravity of 
the offence and accused’s degree of 
responsibility, and the aggravating circumstances 
were not considered. In the Crown’s view, a 
lengthy prison sentence was required in cases of 
this nature.   
 
Justice Drapeau, writing the unanimous judgment 
for the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 
concluded that the conditional discharge did 
nothing to denounce the crime. Rather, it 
trivialized the breach of trust offence and did 
nothing for deterrence. He stated:  
 
If one unbundles the several principles that 
come into play in shaping a fit sentence for 
conduct by an on-duty police officer amounting 
to criminal breach of trust under s. 122, 
general deterrence and denunciation 
overshadow all others. Those principles 
command more than lip service; they must 
impact upon the sentencing process and help 
shape its outcome.  
 
While some question the usefulness of lengthy 
custodial sentences as a deterrent for 
hardened criminals, no one has voiced any 
thoughtful objection to the view that such 
sentences likely have a beneficial behaviour-
shaping impact on law enforcement personnel, 
who have more than a passing acquaintance 
with penal law and a keen insight into the 
unpleasant reality of prison life. The available 
anecdotal evidence suggests that very few 
law-enforcement officers buy into the 
argument routinely made by defence lawyers 
and occasionally accepted by some judges that 
non-custodial sentences, such as discharges 
and conditional sentences, are truly punitive in 
nature.  
 
Police officers have opportunities, practically 
on a daily basis, to cross the line and engage in 
prohibited conduct. The public trusts them to 
resist the temptation and relies upon the 
courts to deal firmly with those who stray.  
 
In my view, the conditional discharge granted 
at trial is woefully inadequate as a means of 
promoting respect by police officers, and 
other law enforcement personnel, of their 
oath of office.   It is a sentence without any 
deterrent value. [para. 25-28, emphasis added] 
 
As for a fit sentence, the court recognized that 
“only the most exceptional circumstances can 
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justify a discharge, absolute or conditional, for 
breach of trust by a police officer in the 
execution of his duties.” Here, there were no 
exceptional circumstances and a substantial term 
of incarceration was warranted. However, there 
were some circumstances that mitigated a 
lengthy sentence in this case. There was an 
inordinate delay between the charge being laid 
(2000) and sentencing (2003). Furthermore, the 
accused fulfilled all of his probation conditions 
and the Crown, the spokesperson for the public 
interest, recommended a term of 1-3 months in 
jail. Even though a short sentence would not have 
been appropriate at the time of original 
sentencing, with these circumstances a 
significantly reduced duration of incarceration 
was now appropriate. The appeal was allowed, the 
conditional discharge was set aside, and the 
accused was sentenced to 3 months in jail. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
PLAIN VIEW OBSERVATIONS 
ARISING FROM 911 CALL 
SUPPORT WARRANT 
R. v. Carter, 2003 BCCA 632 
 
After responding to a 911 call 
from the accused’s apartment, 
police officer’s could hear 
noises from inside the 
apartment that resembled someone handling a 
firearm. The police withdrew down the hallway 
and the accused exited his apartment and locked 
the door. He was detained outside the apartment 
building and told police that everything was all 
right inside. Nonetheless, the police entered his 
unit where they discovered a small marihuana 
grow operation. The premise was secured and a 
search warrant was obtained. The accused was 
charged with production of marihuana and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking.   
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused plead not guilty. During a voir dire the 
trial judge found no breach of the accused’s s.8 
Charter right (search and seizure) and held the 
evidence to be admissible. In his view, the 
totality of the circumstances justified the police 
entry into the apartment to verify the 
information provided by the accused that 
everything was all right inside. In light of the 
trial judge’s finding on the voir dire the accused 
changed his plea to guilty for the production of 
marihuana charge, mistakenly believing he could 
appeal his conviction and challenge the judge’s 
evidentiary ruling on the s.8 issue. The Crown 
stayed the possession for the purpose of 
trafficking charge and the accused was fined 
$2,000.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge’s 
ruling on the voir dire was in error and that there 
was a miscarriage of justice. Under s.686(1)(a)(iii) 
of the Criminal Code, an appeal court can only 
entertain an appeal from a guilty plea if there are 
grounds that there was a miscarriage of justice. 
With regards to the voir dire, the appeal court 
found the trial judge properly considered the 
circumstances when he found the police entry 
lawful. As for the miscarriage of justice 
argument, the accused submitted that there was 
a miscarriage because there were arguments 
remaining after the voir dire ruling that could 
have resulted in an acquittal, like attacking the 
validity of the issuance of the subsequent search 
warrant on the basis that the police could not use 
their observations after entry to support the 
warrant. In rejecting this contention. Justice 
Finch, for the unanimous court, stated: 
 
…In my view, the argument now proposed by the 
[accused] is not tenable.  There is no authority 
holding that police officers may not testify to 
what was seen by them to be in plain view on an 
entry into premises consequent on a 911 call.  
Their entry was made in the performance of 
their duty to protect public safety and did not 
depend upon establishing grounds for obtaining 
a search warrant. 
 
The argument that the police could not rely on 
what they saw upon such entry in the 
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information to obtain a search warrant is 
inconsistent with the provisions of s. 489(2)(ii) 
of the Criminal Code.  To give effect to the 
[accused’s] argument on this appeal would 
require a conclusion that s. 489(2) is 
constitutionally invalid.  No such argument has 
been advanced on this appeal.  No other ground 
for attacking the search warrant is 
suggested.  In my respectful view, the 
argument that the search warrant could have 
been successfully attacked would be bound to 
fail.  The evidence obtained pursuant to the 
search warrant would have been properly 
admitted and a conviction entered.  There was, 
therefore, no prejudice to the [accused’] 
defence by trial counsel's failure to advance 
this new argument at trial. [para. 9-10] 
 
The Court was not persuaded that there was a 
bona fide defence and therefore no miscarriage 
of justice occurred. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
DETENTION IS MORE THAN 
BELIEF PERSON INVOLVED IN 
OFFENCE 
R. v. Priddle, 2003 BCCA 637 
 
After their dogs entered the 
bushy area of a park, the victim 
and his gay partner saw a man 
kick the dogs. The victim 
entered the bush area and was 
assaulted by the man, including being pulled to the 
ground and kicked about the body resulting in 
bruises and blood in his urine. The victim and his 
partner drove to the nearest telephone and called 
police. Two officers promptly attended the scene. 
An officer went into the bush and found the 
accused seated on a log. He appeared intoxicated 
so the officer shook him by the shoulder to get 
his attention. The officer then asked if the 
accused was having any problems with people and 
he replied, “Fucking faggots and their dogs”. The 
accused was then brought out of the bushes and 
the victim and his partner identified him as the 
assailant.  
 
At trial the judge conducted a voir dire and ruled 
that the accused was not detained by the police 
when he made the utterance. Therefore, s.10(a) 
or (b) were not engaged. In his view, the police 
were merely asking some preliminary investigative 
questions of a person probably responsible for 
the assault. The accused was found guilty of 
assault causing bodily harm. He appealed his 
conviction to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the 
conversation with police should not have been 
admitted into evidence. The court dismissed the 
appeal. Justice Low, for the unanimous court, 
stated: 
 
…[The constable] was simply making preliminary 
enquiries of the [accused] to determine if he 
was involved in the incident under investigation.  
He took no steps to restrain the [accused] and 
did not tell him that he was under restraint.  He 
had reason to believe that the [accused] was 
involved because he fit the description given by 
the two civilian witnesses, but that alone does 
not amount to restraint or to a reasonable 
belief on the part of the [accused] that he was 
then in the control of the police officer.  
 
It was only after the [accused] would not 
provide his name that the constable arrested 
him.  But when the [accused] made the 
incriminating utterance the officer was only 
trying to get his attention, to learn who he was 
and to attempt to determine if he was involved 
in the incident.  As the officer testified, he 
did not yet have the opportunity to detain the 
[accused].  Before the [accused] spoke in the 
manner he did, the constable was simply 
making reasonable enquiries of a person in the 
right location who generally fit the description 
of the person who committed the assault. 
[para. 7-8] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes 
democracy necessary—Reinhold Niebuhr 
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GROUNDS FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT MUST BE TAKEN AS 
A WHOLE, NOT EXAMINED 
INDIVIDUALLY 
R. v. Stewart, 2003 BCCA 636 
 
A police officer received an 
anonymous tip that there was a 
marihuana grow operation at a 
residence and that a male person 
was occasionally seen at this 
location. The officer attended the scene, 
detected an odour of marihuana, and formed the 
opinion that the accused’s residence was the 
source of the smell. A hand held FLIR unit was 
used and the officer concluded there was a 
“significant” heat loss generated from the 
interior of the basement. He then attended the 
power company office and obtained the electrical 
consumption records. However, these records 
were insufficient because the officer could not 
adequately compare the previous occupant’s 
consumption to the current consumption because 
nearly two years had passed since the current 
occupant had assumed responsibility for the 
hydro.  
 
The officer applied for and was granted a search 
warrant for the residence based mainly on the 
following four main areas: 
 
• the anonymous tip; 
• the odour of marihuana from the residence; 
• the FLIR results showing a loss of heat from 
the residence; and 
• the consumption of hydro greater than three 
times the normal  of the average residence. 
 
As a result of the search, the police found 2.5 kg 
of marihuana valued at $9,000 to $27,200 
(depending on how it would be packaged), Ziploc 
bags, and a scale.  At trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the accused argued that the 
search contravened s.8 of the Charter and that 
the evidence was inadmissible under s.24(2). The 
trial judge carefully considered the evidence and 
found—although there were some weaknesses in 
the grounds and individually each of the four main 
factors were insufficient—that when taken as a 
whole upon amplification during the voir dire the 
warrant was valid.  
 
For example, he recognized that an anonymous tip 
by itself was insufficient to justify a search 
warrant. Also, the FLIR reading was of limited 
value because only a small portion of the house 
was examined. The word “significant” in 
describing the level of heat loss was excised from 
the affidavit because of shortcomings with the 
FLIR unit. Finally, the officer made an error 
respecting the hydro records but concluded the 
consumption was double the average and unusually 
high. The trial judge found the search warrant 
valid and the accused was convicted of possession 
of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that there were 
insufficient grounds for the search warrant. 
Thus, he contended that the warrant was invalid, 
the search illegal and a violation of his s.8 
Charter right, and that the evidence should have 
been excluded.  
 
When challenging the validity of a search 
warrant, the onus is on the accused to 
demonstrate that there was no basis for the 
decision of the issuing justice to grant the 
warrant. In other words, the reviewing judge does 
not substitute his opinion on whether a warrant 
should have been issued. Rather, a reviewing 
judge should not interfere if the record that was 
before the authorizing justice, amplified on 
review, was sufficient that the justice could have 
granted the warrant. Fraud, non-disclosure, and 
misleading or new evidence are relevant, but the 
issue remains whether there remains a 
sufficiently reliable basis for the decision to 
grant the warrant. In this case, Justice Oppal on 
behalf of the court dismissed the appeal. In his 
view, there was no error committed by the trial 
judge: 
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…[The]…experienced trial judge, considered 
each of the issues raised by the [accused] and 
concluded that on the basis of the whole of 
the evidence and, in particular, the evidence on 
the voir dire the warrant was valid.  I cannot 
conclude that he either misdirected himself on 
the law or that he was in error on the 
evidence.  He carefully considered the 
[accused’s] arguments relating to the 
misleading information contained in [the 
officer’s] material.  However, he found that 
the officer was correct in attributing the 
smell of marihuana to the [accused’s] 
residence.  He also concluded that while the 
FLIR results were misleading, particularly in 
reference to the word "significant" in 
describing the heat loss, that that the officer 
was acting in good faith.  As well, he concluded 
that the word "significant" could be deleted 
from the information.  He also found that [the 
officer] was acting in good faith when he 
obtained the records from West Kootenay 
Power.  These are findings of fact made by the 
trial judge and ought not lightly be disturbed 
by this Court.  Accordingly, in my view, the 
trial judge was correct in coming to the 
conclusion that the warrant was valid. [para. 
16] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
PRISONER FOUND WITH 
CONCEALED WEAPON 
WARRANTS CONVICTION 
R. v. Kerr, 2003 ABCA 92 
 
The accused was a prison inmate 
who was charged with second-
degree murder and possession of 
a weapon dangerous to the public 
peace. The charges arose from 
an incident in the prison’s eatery/dining area 
when the accused, fearing for his safety from 
other inmates, brought two homemade weapons (a 
knife made from a metal spoon and an ice pick 
fashioned from an oven rack) with him hidden in 
his pants. The deceased attacked the accused 
with a homemade knife and tried to stab him, but 
missed. The accused defended himself and 
stabbed the deceased, who subsequently 
collapsed and died.  
 
At his trial the accused successfully argued that 
he acted in self-defense and he was acquitted of 
the murder charge. As for the dangerous 
possession of a weapon charge under s.88 of the 
Criminal Code, the trial judge concluded that the 
weapons were possessed for the purposes of self-
defence and also found him not guilty of this 
charge. In his view, the prevalence of illegally 
concealed weapons in the prison entitled the 
accused to do the same in order to protect 
himself. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal submitting that the trial judged erred. In 
dismissing the argument against the murder 
acquittal, the appeal court ruled that all the 
elements of self-defence had been established. 
However, the acquittal on the possession of a 
dangerous weapon charge was overturned. Section 
88 of the Criminal Code creates a dual procedure 
offence. It reads: 
 
s.88(1) Criminal Code 
Every person commits an offence who carries or 
possesses a weapon, an imitation of a weapon, a 
prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited 
ammunition for a purpose dangerous to the public peace 
or for the purpose of committing an offence. 
 
In order to sustain a conviction under this 
section, the onus is on the Crown to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to 
possess the weapon for a dangerous purpose. The 
onus is not on the accused to prove a lawful 
purpose regarding the possession. Nor is it 
sufficient that what the accused did with the 
weapon was in fact dangerous, although it may be 
one factor establishing its purpose. Furthermore, 
in some cases, a weapon carried for a strictly 
defensive purpose may not warrant a conviction. A 
court must examine the circumstances ensuring 
to carefully weigh all of the relevant evidence 
including the nature of the weapon, how it was 
acquired, the manner, time, and place of its use, 
and the statements and actions of the accused.  
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In this case, the court found the actions of the 
accused in concealing the weapons, which is an 
offence in itself under s.90 of the Code but not 
relied upon by the Crown, was crucial in 
determining whether the purpose of possession 
was dangerous. In allowing the appeal and 
substituting a conviction, Justice Berger stated: 
 
It is trite that prisoners at the Edmonton 
Institution are precluded from possessing 
weapons of any kind for any purpose. A weapon 
openly brandished would be immediately 
confiscated and the offender charged with a 
disciplinary offence under the Prisons and 
Reformatories Act…In my opinion, the 
dangerous purpose requirement of s. 88 is 
found in s. 90 of the Criminal Code. That is 
because there is an arguable distinction 
between possession of a weapon for defensive 
purposes, say in one's own home where 
concealment is unnecessary, and possession of 
a weapon in a penitentiary setting. The very 
fact of concealment is sufficient to establish 
the ingredients of the crime set out in s. 90. 
Even if the intended purpose is self-defence, 
concealment of a weapon is itself a crime and 
the unlawful purpose is thereby made out. Had 
it been the [accused’s] intention to deter the 
apprehended attack, it was open to him to 
display his weapons to the deceased in a timely 
manner. The act of concealment rendered it 
more likely that there would be a breach of 
the peace. While concealment facilitated the 
[accused’s] counter-attack, it also contributed 
to an already dangerous situation of which the 
[accused] was fully aware. The decision to 
conceal his weapons evidences the [accused’s] 
choice of reprisal over deterrence. His 
unlawful purpose, one that is dangerous to the 
public peace, is thereby made out. [para. 30] 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Bad administration, to be sure, can destroy good 
policy; but good administration can never save bad 
policy—Adlai Stevenson 
 
 
WHERE WE HAVE COME FROM:  
CONTACT AND COVER 
Sgt. Dave Schmirler 
 
With the start of a new 
British Columbia Police 
Academy recruit class, the 
training of a new generation 
of police officers continues.  
To one seasoned instructor, 
training begins with a 
review of where we have 
come from in policing. 
 
One of the major concepts in officer safety 
training is founded in the concept of “contact and 
cover”.  This is taught early in the academy 
training, and for a recent class, even before they 
were transitioned from civilian attire to police 
uniform.  To many police officers the concept of 
“contact and cover” is a staple of everyday work.   
 
Even experienced officers make mistakes.  In 
making contact with violators and dealing with 
subjects, we can focus on the individual and lose 
track of what is going on behind us, or with the 
other officers. How many of us can recite the 
terrible cost to two officers that resulted in a 
now accepted police tactic? 
 
On September 14, 1984 it cost two officers their 
lives. It what is called the “Grape Street Park 
incident”, two officers made contact with a small 
group of males in a well-known park in San Diego, 
California.  Both officers had less than two years 
experience.  The contact was centered on a liquor 
violation.  Both officers had their attention 
focused on a subject and during the check; one 
officer attempted a pat-down of one of the adult 
males. The suspect resisted and pulled out a 9mm 
handgun. The suspect fatally shot one officer 
several times then shot the second officer.  The 
second officer would die two days later.  Neither 
officer had time to draw their weapons. 
 
From this, and during an era when the San Diego 
PD was losing officers at an alarming rate, came 
 Volume 3 Issue 6 
November/December 2003 
62
the concept of Contact and Cover.  Police train to 
use contact and cover principles on all stops and 
contacts. One officer does all the contact, 
paperwork, radio, computer, etc., while the cover 
officer simply covers the contact officer by 
watching the action and surroundings from a 
position of advantage. 
 
This concept is new to our recruit officers.  Some 
of them young enough to speak of the North 
Hollywood shootout as something they “remember 
seeing”. 
 
The San Diego officers were Kimberly Tonahill, 
age 24 with 9-months service and Timothy Ruopp 
with 2 years service. 
 
Remember them. 
  
SCREENING DEVICE FAILURE 
SUPPORTS REASONABLE 
GROUNDS 
R. v. Girouard, 2003 NBCA 84 
 
A police officer found the 
accused in the driver’s seat of a 
motor vehicle attempting to 
extricate it from a ditch. He 
detected the smell of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath and demanded a roadside screening test. 
After several failed opportunities to provide a 
sample, the officer arrested the accused for 
refusing to provide a sample. He was transported 
to the police station where he spoke to a lawyer. 
After speaking to his lawyer, the accused asked 
the officer if he could provide a sample into the 
screening device. The device registered a fail 
reading, prompting the officer to read the 
breathalyzer demand. The accused again spoke to 
counsel and subsequently provided two breath 
samples resulting in readings in excess of 80mg%.  
 
At his trial the judge concluded the fail reading 
on the roadside screening device provided the 
officer with the requisite reasonable grounds on 
which to justify the breathalyzer demand. The 
certificate of breath readings was admitted and 
the accused was convicted of care and control 
while over 80mg%. The accused’s appeal to the 
New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench on several 
grounds, was dismissed. The accused further 
appealed, this time to the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal, again arguing, in part, that the 
roadside sample was not provided forthwith and 
that the fail result could not be used as 
reasonable grounds. 
 
Forthwith 
 
Section 254 of the Criminal Code allows a police 
officer to make a demand of a person operating 
or in care and control of a vehicle, reasonably 
suspected of having alcohol in their body, to 
forthwith provide a breath sample into a roadside 
screening device. The accused submitted that the 
more than one hour delay from the demand to the 
taking of the roadside sample was not forthwith. 
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal unanimously 
rejected this ground of appeal. The sample in this 
case was not taken pursuant to the demand. The 
accused had been arrested for refusal and was 
provided an opportunity to speak to his lawyer. He 
then requested to provide a sample, which he 
failed. The sample given was offered by the 
accused. It was voluntary and was not subject to 
the strict requirements of the demand section. 
 
Reasonable Grounds 
 
The accused contended that the fail reading on 
the roadside screening device could not form the 
basis for reasonable grounds, absent other indicia 
of impairment. After reviewing previous case law 
on this very issue, the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal found that a roadside fail result may, by 
itself, be sufficient to provide reasonable 
grounds provided the test was properly 
conducted. If, however, the officer knew of 
circumstances making the results unreliable, such 
as recently consumed liquor (mouth alcohol), 
belching, or vomiting, the fail result will not be 
sufficient to provide the necessary grounds for 
the demand. In refusing to grant leave to appeal, 
Justice Larlee held: 
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In the case at bar, [the constable] admitted at 
trial that up until the time he received a "fail" 
reading on the roadside screening device, he 
did not have reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that [the accused’s] ability to drive 
was impaired by alcohol. [The constable] had a 
reasonable suspicion of impairment based on 
finding the car in the ditch and the smell of 
alcohol on [the accused’s] breath. On that 
basis, [the constable] had the necessary 
grounds to administer the roadside screening 
test. However, [the accused] did not provide 
the necessary samples at that point. After 
consulting with counsel, [the accused] 
voluntarily provided the samples at the police 
station. This fact does not eliminate the 
reasonable suspicion formed by [the constable] 
prior to administering the test at the roadside 
early in the night. After the failed roadside 
screening test, [the constable] then had 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
Breathalyzer demand…[para. 14] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY’s DUAL 
PURPOSE DOES NOT VITIATE 
SUBSEQUENT WARRANT 
R. v. Waldron, 2003 BCCA 442 
 
The police responded to the 
scene of a warehouse fire after 
the fire department called them. 
A fire captain told a police 
officer they had found a 
marihuana grow operation and invited him inside. 
The police officer then entered the premises to 
check on the possibility of a break and 
enter/arson due to the nature and location of the 
fire (the front door) and located a room inside 
containing marihuana plants, growing trays, lights, 
and a plant feeding system. A search warrant was 
subsequently obtained by another police officer, 
but the information failed to disclose that the 
attending officer had been told of the presence 
of the grow operation before his entry to 
investigate the arson.  The police seized several 
exhibits and incriminating documents, including 
four fingerprints belonging to the accused on a 
scale, pesticide bottle, and two separate light 
shrouds. However, the seized property was 
destroyed 5 days later on the instructions of the 
property office manager. 
 
At his trial on charges of unlawfully producing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused was convicted. The trial 
judge concluded that the fire captain expressly 
invited the attending officer into the premises to 
assist him in carrying out his duties under the 
Fire Services Act because there was evidence of 
an attempted forced entry to the premises. Even 
though the officer testified to having a dual 
purpose, investigating the possible break in with 
arson and to confirm the existence of a grow 
operation, the judge ruled the entry lawful and 
not unreasonable. The judge did, however, find 
parts of the information to obtain the search 
warrant misleading in that the information failed 
to disclose the foreknowledge of the grow prior 
to the initial police entry. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred 
in upholding the validity of the search warrant 
and that the early destruction of the evidence 
deprived him of the right to make full answer and 
defence to the charges. In rejecting the ground 
that the warrant was invalid, Chief Justice Finch 
stated: 
 
The record before the authorizing judge, as 
amplified on review, shows that the authorizing 
judge could have granted the order.  Both the 
fire department investigator and [the police 
officer] were lawfully in the premises.  Both 
saw the grow operation in place.  This direct 
evidence formed the essential basis of the 
information.  The complaints about other 
aspects of the information do not detract from 
this direct evidence. 
 
The learned trial judge found as a fact [the 
police officer] entered the warehouse unit 
lawfully.  He entered in order to investigate a 
breaking and entering, believing he would also 
find a marihuana grow operation.  These 
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findings of fact are not challenged.  [The 
police officer’s] belief that he would find 
evidence of further criminal activity cannot 
undo or undermine the valid basis for his 
lawful entry of the premises without a search 
warrant. [para. 7-8] 
 
Early destruction of evidence 
 
The accused’s position was that the early 
destruction of the exhibits was an abuse of 
process and deprived him of his right to make full 
answer and defence to the charges, a right 
protected under s.7 of the Charter. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed, upholding the 
lower court’s ruling. The accused failed to 
demonstrate any realistic possibility that access 
to the destroyed property could have assisted his 
defence. As the trial judge noted, even if other 
fingerprints were found, it would only 
demonstrate a joint enterprise. The destruction 
of the evidence was an “honest blunder”. The 
police did not deliberately decide to destroy the 
evidence nor was its disposal due to a systemic 
disregard to destroy evidence. This ground of 
appeal was also dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SEASON’S GREETINGS 
 
The staff at the Police 
Academy would like to wish 
our “In-Service:10-8” 
readers and their families all 
the best for this holiday 
season. It has been a pleasure serving British 
Columbia’s police officers, and our other readers 
across the country, by bringing them up-to-date 
on many of the issues facing them daily as they 
go about protecting and serving the citizens of 
their communities. May you have a safe and 
blessed Christmas and all the best in 2004. 
 
Check out full Police Leadership 
2004 Conference details starting 
on page 3. 
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
2004 CONFERENCE 
 
“Excellence in Policing Through 
Community Health, 
Organizational Performance and 
Personal Wellness” 
 
Location: 
 
The Westin Bayshore 
Vancouver, British Columbia 
 
Dates: 
 
April 5, 6 & 7, 2004 
 
Registration Fee: 
  
$325  
(includes reception, 2 lunches and the 
banquet dinner) 
Advanced seminar/increment 
course additional $75  
 
Keynote Speakers: 
 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin  
Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
Mr. Gordon Graham 
LAPD Chief William J. Bratton  
RCMP Comm. Giuliano Zaccardelli  
 
Please check the Justice Institute of B.C. 
website for more information and details at 
www.policeleadership.org 
 
 
